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PROMISES MADE SUBSEQUENTLY

TO THE CREATION

OF THE DEBT.

In the previous portion of this study we discussed the enforceability of oral promises by a third party to pay a debt created
simultaneously with or subsequently to the promise. In the present
installment we propose to examine the enforceability of an oral
promise to pay a debt already in existence. The cases in which the
applicability of the statute of frauds to such promises has been in
issue divide themselves analytically into three main categories 1)
those in which the promise creates no additional independent (i.e.
not derivative) right in the creditor in reference to the debt; 2)
those in which the promise does create an additional .independent
right in the creditor in reference to the debt, 3) those in which the
promise creates no additional liability in the promisor.
1.
Situations in Which the Statute is Not Applicable Because the
Promise Creates No Additional Independent Right for the
Creditorin Reference to the Debt.
The proposition as stated is misleading only in its apparent
simplicity The difficulties are encountered when the attempt is
made to determine precisely when no "additional independent
right" is created in the creditor by virtue of the promise. These
difficulties can best be resolved by a further subdivision of the
cases into three general type-situations A) where the promise is
*For prior installment, see 31 Minn. Law Review 1.
-
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made to the debtor or one secondarily liable on the main debt,
B) where the promise made is coupled with the extinguishment
of the main debt (novations) , C) where the promise creates a
right only in contemplation of another debt (fidelity insurance)
A.
Promises to the Debtor or to PersonsSecondarily Liable
Where A makes a promise to 1Bthat he will pay B's debt to (,
it is universally recognized that non-compliance with the statute of

frauds is no bar to a recovery by B against A on A's failure to pay
C. While in this type of case the courts have sometimes found
difficulties as to the sufficiency of the consideration' supporting
such a promise or as to the measure of damages 2 or as to the en'These doubts have no bearing on the application of the statute of frauds
and pertain exclusively to the law of consideration. In jurisdictions where
a detriment to the promisee is sufficient consideration, there should be no
doubt that the following contract is valid A promises to B that he will pay
B's debt to C in consideration that B forbears to enforce a claim against E.
It may be doubtful whether C could sue A on such promise, but even that
is recognized where the liberal version of the creditor-beneficiary doctrine
applies. 2 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (rev. ed. 1936)
sec. 2371.
1t is recognized in the majority of jurisdictions that a breach of a
promise to pay the promisee's debt to a third person entitles tie promisee
to sue for damages measured by the debt. 2 Sedgwick, A Treatise on the
Measure of Damages (9th ed. 1912) secs. 789 ff., 2 Williston, op. cit. supra
note 1, secs. 361, 390, 1408 (vol. 5) The rule is followed in Minnesota.
Merriam v. Pine Lumber Co., (1877) 23 Minn. 314, Hems v. Byers, (1928)
174 Minn. 350, 219 N. W 287 In the latter case, involving a promise to pay
plaintiff's debt in consideration of the transfer of certain assets, the court said
"The contract is not one of indemnity. It is a contract to pay and discharge
a debt of the plaintiff made upon a consideration moving from the plaintiff
to the defendants. In cases of such sort the authorities are fairly in accord,
or at least it is the prevailing doctrine, that one in the position of the
plaintiff may recover, and that the amount of the debt is the measure of
his damages." It is hard to understand why the court emphasized that the
consideration moved between the parties when only the measure of damages
was the issue. The distinction between promises to pay and promises to
indemnify is often made, although the correct distinction should be betweeu
indemnity against liability and indemnity against loss. The indemnity mentioned by the cases in this connection refers obviously to indemnities against
loss. See the discussions in Comment, (1935) 24 Cal. L. Rev. 193, and Note,
(1925) 9 Minn. L. Rev. 269. If such a promise gives a creditor beneficiary
the right to sue, the promisee and the creditor may maintain an action for
the amount of the debt, but the defendant may obtain protection against the
danger of paying twice. Hemns v. Byers, loc. cit. supra, Gustafson v. Koehler,
(1929) 177 Minn. 115, 224 N. W 699; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 1,

secs. 390-393. Aksbetween the promisor and the promisee in the cases of aii
assumption of a mortgage, it is recognized in Minnesota that the grantee is
the principal and the grantor the surety, which would give him also a right
to exoneration, cf. Johnson v. Freberg, (1940) 207 Minn. 61, 289 N. W 835,
while in cases of mere purchase "subject to" the grantee is the surqty and
the land the principal fund. Citizens State Bank v. Peters, (1930) 179 Minn.
330,229 N. W 129.

SURETYSHIP AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS

forcement in equity of the promise,3 the non-applicability of the
statute of frauds seems to have been beyond doubt. Such is also
4
the position of the Restatements.
The leading case in Minnesota laying down this. doctrine is
Goetz-v. Foos.5 In that case defendant agreed in consideration of
the conveyance of a brickyard by plaintiff to pay the latter's debt'
to one Sauerbrey. Defendant failed to pay and the court permitted recovery upon the following ground "The debt in this
case was owing by plaintiff to Sauerbrey, and the promise to pay
it was made not to Sauerbrey, but to plaintiff. A promise of this
character is not within the provisions of the statute of frauds
relating to promises 'to answer for the debt, default or doings of
another.' This provision applies only to promises made to persons
to whom another is liable." It should be clearly noted that the
court gave as ratio decidendi for the non-applicability of the statute
the fact that the promise was made to the debtor and not to the
creditor. No weight was given to the fact that the promisor obtained an independent economic advantage from the promisee,
although under another respectable line of authorities this would
also have taken the promise out of the statute." The reason given
by the court is supported by. an early leading English case.- A
later Minnesota case" which likewise involved a suit by the
promisee on an undertaking under analogous circumstances reached

the same result but neither cited Goetz v. Foos nor advanced any
reason why the promise was valid.
While according to this construction of the statute there is no
room for its application when the debtor sues on a promise made
to him to discharge the debt, it need not be automatically concluded
that this rule also applies when the creditor sues on such a promise.
Of course, the question of the applicability of the statute pre3
The difficulties have arisen mostly in connection with contracts for
indemnity against loss. See Comment, (1935) 24 Cal. L. Rev. 193, 198,
Note,4 (1925) 9 Mim. L. Rev. 269.
Restatement, Security, sec. 100; Restatement, Contracts, sec. 191.
5(1869) 14 Minm. 265, 100 Am. Dec. 218. One year before tlhts case the
federal circuit court for the District of Minnesota announced the same rule
in a 0bankruptcy case. Phelps v. Clasen, (1868) Fed. Cas. 11,074.
See infra text following note 124. Some of the cases relied on by
Goetz v. Foos were decided on that ground. Barker v. Bucklin, (1846) 2 Den.
(N.Y.) 45, 60, 43 Am. Dec. 726; Alger v. Scoville, (1854) 1 Gray (Mass.)
391.
7Eastwood v. Kenyon, (1840) 11 Ad. & Ell. (Q.B.) 438, 113 E. R. 482.
In this case, which is apparently the first one to announce the rule, Lord
Denmansaid: "Upon consideration we are of opinion that the statute applies
only to promises made to the person to whom another is answerable."
SKlemik v. Hendncksen Jewelry Co., (1915) 128 Minn. 490, 151 N. W
203.
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supposes that otherwise the creditor could recover This involves
the notorious problem of contracts for the benefit of third parties,
and particularly the phase which relates to "creditor beneficiaries."
According to the "American Doctrine"9 a creditor may recover
on a promise given to the debtor to discharge his debt, although
some of the details are controversial.10 The Restatement of Contracts provides that "A promise to discharge the promisee's duty
creates a duty of the promisor to the creditor beneficiary to perform
the promise."' 1 Professor Williston adds the further qualification
that "the promisee's object in a contract to discharge his debt
must always be primarily, and generally solely, to secure his own
advantage.' 1 2 The Minnesota cases predicate a right to recover on
the part of the creditor upon an intent to benefit the latter by the
parties to the contract, couched in varying phraseology 18
In case that such intent exists the promise must, of course, be
supported by a valid consideration. While the majority of the
Minnesota cases 14 involve situations in which the promise to pay
the debt was in the form of an "assumption" of the latter in connection with the transfer of some or all of his assets by the promisee
to the promisor, there is no particular reason why this is necessary If the creditor's right is predicated upon the existence of a
present (or future) debt to him by the promisee and upon the
intent of the contracting parties that he should have a right derived
trom the promise, then any consideration sufficient to support the
promise should be adequate. 15
Where the creditor had a right to sue the promisor by reason
of a contract made for his benefit by the defendant with the debtor,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has persistently held the statute of
frauds to be inapplicable. However, the reasons given for this result have not been so uniform. There are four avenues which could
be pursued to establish an argument against the applicability of the
statute under such circumstances. In the first place it could be
reasoned that the creditor's right is merely a dervative one based
on a promise made not to him but to the debtor Secondly, it could
aSee Barnes v Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 56 Minn. 38, 42, 57 N. W
314. 45 Am. S. Rep. 438.
loSee 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 1, secs. 361, 380.
" 1Restatement, Contracts, sec. 136 (1) (a)
122 Williston, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 361, text following footnote 2.
13DeWerff, Third Party Beneficiary Contracts in Minnesota, (1945) 29
Minn. L. Rev. 436, 449.
14Practically all of the Minnesota cases involving the application of
the statute of frauds to suits by creditors upon third party beneficiary contracts fall in this class.
152 Williston, op. cit. supra note 1,sec. 371.
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be said that as between the promisee and the pronisor the latter
is primarily liable and the statute of frauds cannot be invoked by
the principal. Again, it could be insisted that in most instances a
new and independent consideration moving to the promisee supports the promise and that therefore the form requirement need
not be complied with. Finally it could be urged in the "assumption"
cases that the property transferred to the promisee was impressed
with a trust in favor of the creditor.
Before analyzing the Minnesota cases as to their reliance on any
of these four reasons, it may be helpful to scrutinize the validity of
the reasons. If the rule of Goetz v. Foos is accepted as a valid
ground for excluding the statute of frauds in suits by the debtor,
it would be inconsistent to hold otherwise in suits by the creditor
where his recovery is based on"the third party beneficiary doctrine.
The very definition of his right makes it, at least to a certain degree, derivative in scope and nature. 6 Since the creditor could
otherwise sue the debtor and the debtor the promisor nothing but
an unnecessary circuity of actions would be accomplished. - Since
162 Williston, op. cit. supra note 1, secs. 364, 397, text to footnote I. This
characterization can be accorded to the creditor's right even in urisdictions
where, like in Minnesota, the creditor may sue both debtor and the new
promisor, and one without joining the other, cf. 2 Williston, op. cit. supra
note 1, sec. 393, and where m addition the debtor may sue the promisor for
substantial and not merely nominal damages. 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note
1, sec. 392; see supra note 2.
17This reason is apparently overlooked by Professor Williston in sec.
460, op. cit. supra note 1. The learned author cites with approval the cases
which like Goetz v. Foos do not permit the defense of the statute in suits by
the debtor on a prormse made to him to discharge the debt. But he continues
"Where the promise to the debtor is held to give the creditor a direct right
against a new promisor without destroying his right against the original
debtor, the case is identical in legal effect and logically might be regarded as
identical for purposes of the Statute with a case where the promise is made
directly to the creditor in return for consideration furnished by the debtor, as
where the liability of the original debtor still persists, but the theory of the
Statute is not carried to its logical conclusion in this situation." In Professor
Williston's example the creditor's right is nwt derivative, and, furthermore.
the debtor has no right against the promisor so that no circuity of actions
would result. There is enough of a difference m the two situations as to consider the application of the Statute in the one and not in the other as "logically"
consistent. While it is true that the precedent upon which Goetz v. Foos
relied was decided in England where a creditor could not have sued oii such
promises, it should be observed that the dangers against which the statute
was designed to guard are likewise not present where the creditor can sue.
Arant, A Rationale For the Interpretation of the Statute of Frauds in
Suretyship Cases, (1928) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 716, 719-721, Restatement. Contracts, sec. 191 comment; Restatement, Security, sec. 100 comment. Finally
it is questionable whether the statute would not be even inapplicable ii
Professor Williston's situation of a promise to the creditor for a consideration
from the debtor, since it might be considered an independent economic advantage making such promise an original one. See infra, section on "main
purpose," text following footnote 140.
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invariably in these situations the promisor will be the party primarily liable and the promzsee only secondarily liable insofar as
their relation inter se is concerned, the second argument-which
is nothing but a specific application of Professor Williston's suretytest'--will not lead to any different results and is in effect only
another way of looking at the situation. This, however can by
no means be said about the third argument. If the reason for considering the promise as original and not as collateral is the fact
that a new and independent consideration moved from the pronisee
to the promisor" then we might find situations where according to
the first two reasons indicated the statute would not apply while
according to the third one the opposite result would follow Thus
suppose that A promises B to pay B's debt to C in consideration that B forbears the enforcement of a debt against E.
Such a promise would give C an enforceable right against A, apart
from the statute of frauds, since B's forbearance would constitute
legally sufficient consideration.20 The fourth argument is without
doubt the narrowest and the weakest. It stems from the days when
the trust doctrine was used to give C an enforceable right. In so far
it has been justly and convincingly criticized by Professor Williston.2 1 This, of course, does not mean that there are no situations
where the creditor might gain rights against a third person by reason of a trust created in his favor by the debtor for purposes of
payment. Assignments "in trust" for the benefit of creditors are a
2 2-

well-known example.

In the first Minnesota case involving our problem, Walsh v
Kattenburgh,23 the defendant orally promised a debtor that he
would pay his debt to plaintiff, which arose in connection with the
finishing of certain logs, as part of the purchase price of the logs.
Subsequently the defendant made the same oral promise to the
plaintiff himself in consideration of the release of his possessory
lien. Justice Flandrau held that the first promise was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, while the second one constituted a
' 8 See the previous chapter, (1946) 31 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 4 note 23, 9
text to note 43.
19This reason for an exception to the statute is discussed infra tinder the
"Main Purpose" rule.
202 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec.
371, supra, note 1.
212 Williston, op. cit. supra note 20, sec. 348.
22
See 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, chp. 577 Further, trusts for the benefit of
creditors may be created pursuant to chapter 501, 501.11 subdivisions I and 6.
The difference between trusts under these two chapters was referred to in
Moore v. Bettingen, (1911) 116 Minn. 142, 145, 133 N. W 561, Ann. Cas.
1913A, 816.
23(1862) 8 Minn. 127
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good cause for recovery He gave no reasons why the promise was
collateral in one and original in the other instance and cited no
authorities for his amazing ruling. Although the final result reached
appears sound and fair, the way by which it is reached is open to
criticism.
Later Minnesota cases have not admitted the statute of frauds
as a good defense against an action by the creditor beneficiary.
While the Supreme Court has sometimes cited its decision in Goetz
v. Foos as controlling precedent even in this type of case, it has
always pointed out in addition than an independent beneficial consideration moved to the promisor and that the statute was therefore inapplicable. Thus, in Sullivan v. Murphy2- ' the court permitted recovery of the amount of a promissory note issued by a
corporation against a partnership which had taken over the corporate assets under the agreement to pay the corporate debts after
commenting tersely: "The promise of defendants, made to the corporation, to assume and pay its debts, is an original undertaking,
and not a collateral one, and therefore not within the statute of
frauds. Goetz v. Foos and cases cited." In Starilia v. Greenvood"5
the court reiterated simply "Where a debtor transfers his property
to another who in consideration thereof, promises to pay the debt
of the former, the promise is an original and not a collateral one,
and therefore not within the statute of frauds and need not be in
writing. Sidlivan v. Murphy." The only situation of this type
where no transfer of property was involved is Van Cappellan v.
Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. 26 In that case an injured employee of the railroad had brought suit against the latter. The
litigation was terminated by a compromise in which the railroad
promised to pay the employee a certain amount in cash and also pay
his doctor's bill. The suit before the Supreme Court dealt with a
claim by the physician against the railroad on the strength of
this promise. The court dismissed the plea of the statute with the
words: "There was therefore a direct consideration for the promise
and was not within the statute of frauds." Goetz v. Foos was not
cited.
As a result of this survey it must be admitted that, while the
court has invoked, at least by reference, the rule that the statute
does not apply where the promise to pay the debt is made to
the debtor in the cases where the creditor beneficiary has sued,
- (1876) 23 Minn. 6.

25(1881) 28 Minn. 521, 11 N. W 76.
26(1914) 126 Minn. 251, 148 N. W 104.
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in every instance it had situations before it where a new economic
advantage moved from the promisee to the promisor and the
statute also for that reason did not apply Whether the court
would go so far and apply the rule of Goetz v Foos in cases
where such is not the case cannot be concluded with certainty on
the present state of authority Logically, however, and considering
the policy of the statute, a restriction to this type of consideration
would not be necessary, as mentioned above.
Another class of cases where the promise is not made to the
creditor but to a person actually or about to become secondarily
liable and where the applicability of the statute has created tremendous difficulties is where the promise was to indemnify a surety
A good deal has been written on the subject 27 and it must be
admitted that the decisions are in a state of confusion and
ambiguity Section 96 of the Restatement of Security 2s provides
as follows
"A promise which is not within the terms of sections 91, 92, oi
93 made to a surety or one about to become a surety to.indemnify
him against liability or loss arising from his being or becoming a
surety is within the Statute of Frauds, if at the time when the
promise is made or becomes a contract, the principal also is under
a duty to indemnify the surety "
The statement of the rule indicates its reason. The promisee may
have a dual capacity if he is not only a party secondarily liable
but also a potential creditor in relation to the principal-by reason
of quasi-contract or express contract-then the promise to indemnify is collateral to this latter debt and therefore covered by the
29
statute unless exempt for other reasons.
It should be noted that the majority of the American decisions
have not enunciated a rule of this kind, but have frequently used
language which is opposed to it. Yet on their facts a great number
of them might be reconciled with the rule of the Restatement
because they would have fallen under one of its specifically
enumerated exceptions. 30 The most important among the latter
27See Arnold, Indemnity Contracts and the Stattute of Frauds, (1925)
9 Minn. L. Rev. 401, Corbin, Contracts of Indemnity and the Statute of
Frauds, (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 689; 2 Williston, A Treatise on the Law
of Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 482, Arnold, Suretyship and Guaranty
(1927) secs. 65 ff. (identical with the article cited) , Browne, A Treatise on
the Construction of the Statute of Frauds (5th ed. 1895) sec. 161.
2sSimilar
is Restatement, Contracts, sec. 186.
2
The three reasons listed by the Restatement are* that the promise (a)
is made in connection with a novation, (b) expresses only a duty existing

apart from the promise or (c) is made for the main advantage of the promisor.

(Secs. 91, 92, 93)
3OIbid.
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is the so-called "main-purpose" rule which will be discussed in the
next section.
Before analyzing the different situations which have given
rise to the uncertainties connected with the application of the
statute to this type of promise, it should be realized that the term
"promise to indemnify" in itself cannot be used as technical criterion unless carefully circumscribed. Professor Arnold, fully
aware of this fact, has made an attempt to list seven principal
features that differentiate contracts of indemnity from contracts
of guaranty. 31 Without quarreling with the author about the
details, which are by no means free from doubt, it must be observed
that his seven contrasting characteristics are valid at best for the
purpose of the application of the statute. Boiled down to their
essence, they paraphrase the somewhat unsatisfactory proposition
that any promise to another to save him harmless from a duty to
pay is an indemnity contract provided it is not a contract of guaranty. The definition of the latter as pieced together from Professor
Arnold's various propositions - comes down to this A guaranty
within the meaning of the statute is a promise of payment to a
person to whom another is answerable for a debt owed in case the
latter defaults. But there still remains the ambiguity of when and
what is a "debt owed" so as to make the promise of protection
against default a guaranty-which is precisely the crux of the
matter. As Professor Arnold himself emphasized,33 only an analysis and grouping of the typical case situations can help to arrive
at consistent and fair results.
The failure to pursue this approach produced the oftenlamented "vascillations" of the English judges which reflected
themselves on the course of American case law. The first of these
influential cases were Tionas v. Cook3 and Green v. Cresswcll."
In the former the oral promise by a surety on a bond to hold
plaintiff harmless, if he would join him as cosurety, was enforced
after plaintiff was compelled to pay. 36 In the second case the
promise by defendant, not a party to the bond, that he would
indemnify plaintiff if he would become bail for another was de31

Loc. cit. supra note 27, p. 414.
32Ibid.
33
Loc. cit supra note 27, p. 419.
34(1828) 8 Barn. & Cress. 728, 108 E. R. 1213, 3 Man. & Ry. 444.
35(1839) 10 Ad. & EU. 453, 113 E. R. 172, 2 Per. & Day. 430.
"Judge
Bayley made the unfortunate statement that "A promise to
mdemnify does not, as it appears to me, fall within either the words or the
policy of the statute of frauds."
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clared unenforceable because the promise was not reduced to
writing.37 Because of the language used by Lord Justice Denman
in the Green Case it was thought that the latter overruled Thomas
v. Cook. But owing to a misunderstanding of an intermediate case"
Green v. Cresswell was in fact overruled by the later case of Wildes
v. Dudlow3 9 which involved an analogous fact situation.
It is believed that the rule of Restatement40 can be considered
as the proper guide for the question of the application of the
statute to the manifold situations which have been lumped together
under the mischievous label, "promises to indemnify a surety "
Yet, a true perspective can be attained only if the rules are developed for the various cases without reference to the word "indeinnity" but exclusively on the terms and the policy of the statute.
An understanding of the American decisions can be facilitated
by separating the cases into two main groups 1) cases in which
the promise to save the surety harmless from the results of his
undertaking was made by a person not independently 1 liable to the
creditor, 2) cases in wich such promise was made by a person
either principally or secondarily liable to the creditor.
1) In the cases falling within the first group, the correct
application of the statute requires a further subdivision.
a) If the principal is not liable to the surety for reimbursement, regardless of whether such liability is premised on contract
or quasi-contract, it is evident that the statute by its very terms
cannot apply 42 The promisor's undertaking could not be said to
be "collateral" to any debt owed to the promisee. Such would
obviously be the case where the principal is a minor in the states
S7Lord Denman, C. J., repudiated Thomas v. Cook by saying" "Every
promise to become answerable for the debt or default of another may be
shaped as an indemnity; but even in that shape, we cannot see why it may
not be within the words of the statute. Within the mischief of the statute

it most certainly falls."
3
SReader v. Kingham, (1862) 13 C. B. (N.S.) 344, 143 E. R. 137 In
this case which has been thought by later cases to have overruled Green v.
Cresswell, Erle, C. J., alluded to a possibility that "the fact of the promise
relating to bail" might make a valid distinction but refused to consider it
further. He decided that the oral promise to a bailiff to pay him a certain slim
for the postponement of the execution of a warrant for imprisonment for
debt issued against a relative of promisor was enforceable. A careful reading
of the words in their context shows that he emphasized that the "promise

of defendant in this case is a collateral promise and not within the statute."
(Italics ours) Cf. Arnold, loc. cit. supra note 27, pp. 416-417
39(1874)
L. R. 19 Eq. 198 (V.C.)
40See supra text to note 29.
411f the creditor has a right to recover against the "indemnitor" on
the third
party beneficiary doctrine, the result would not be altered.
42See Resseter v. Waterman, (1894) 151 111. 169, 177, 37 N. E. 875.
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where contracts of infants are void.43 Beyond this one type,
however, a great deal of uncertainty can be found. In England,
oral promises to indemnify a surety on a criminal bail bond are
another instance of undertakings which can be enforced without
running contra to the terms of the statute. Such promises would
not be "collateral" 44 for the reason that it has been decided that
public policy precludes any recovery by the surety from the accused
either on an implied 45 or an express contract.'8 It has likewise
been held in a few early American cases that a party liable on a
criminal bail bond has no right of redress against the accused
although he made a specific contract to that effect.' 7 Other jurisdictions have ruled that public policy only excludes recovery on
an implied contract but does not bar reimbursement where there
has been an express promise. 4 A number of states, finally, have
abolished all distinctions between criminal and civil bail in that
respect.'9 Thus, in an American jurisdiction where the public
policy precludes recovery by the bail from the accused (and assuming that indemnity agreements of the bail with other persons
are not so tainted" 0), an oral promise by a stranger to indemnify
43See Anderson v. Spence, (1880) 72 Ind. 315, 321, 37 Am. Rep. 162:
"The general rule runmng through almost all the cases is, that, if the third
person is not liable, then the undertaking is not within the statute. This
doctrine is exemplified m the great number of cases, which hold that a
promise to answer for the debt or default of an infant or feme covert is not
within the statute, because there is no third person bound." This exception
is recognized by the Restatement of Security m Illustration 5 to sec. 96.
In Chapin v. Laphan, (1838) 20 Pick. (Mass.) 467, the Massachusetts
court recognized that because the debtor was a minor there was no liability
on him to reimburse the surety but concluded from this that the surety therefore gave "entire credit" to the mdemnitor. See the comment on this case in
Kingsley v. Balcome, (1848) 4 Barb. (N.Y.) 131, 134.
4Cripps
v. Hartnoll, (1863) 4 B. & S. 414, 122 E. R.514.
456jones v. Orchard, (1855) 16 C. B. 614, 139 E. R. 900.
4 Rex v. Porter, (1910) 1 L. R. K. B. 369.
47Dunkin v. Hodge, (1871) 46 Ala. 523, Ratcliffe v. Smith, (1877) 13
Bush. (Ky.) 172.
4sSansome v. Samuelson, (Minn. 1946) 24 N. IV (2d) 702, 703, Carr v.
Davis, (1908) 64 W Va. 522, 524, 63 S.E. 326, 20 L. N. S.58, 16 Ann.
Cas. 491031.
Badolato v. Molinai, (1919) 106 Misc. 342, 174 N. Y. S.512; Exchange Trust Co. v. Mann, (1928) 131 Okla. 302, 269 Pac. 275, Reynolds
(1847) 2 Strobh. (S. Car.) 87
v. Harral,
50
Recovery on an indemnity agreement between the surety and a cosurety
or third party has been permitted in every case where the question was
raised. Leary v. United States, (1912) 224 U. S.567, 32 S.Ct. 599, 56 L. Ed.
889, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1029; Teschhauser v. Jarms, (1998) 95 Cal. App. 524,
App. 502, Banks v. Brodofsky,
273 Pac. 66; Brysorl v. Fischer, (1930) 258 Ill.
(1931) 161 Miss. 466, 137 So. 328, Sansome v. Samuelson, (Minn. 1946)
24 N.,W (2d) 702; Maloney v. Nelson, (1894) 144 N. Y. 182. 39 N. E. 82;
Maloney v. Nelson, .(1899) 158 N. Y. 351, 53 N. E. 31, Western Surety
Co. v. Kelley, (1911) 27 S. Dak. 465, 131 N. W 808. It is otherwise, of
470.
course, if there is a collusive intent. Baehr v. Wolf, (1871) 59 Ill.
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the former would be enforceable despite the statute of frauds, a
result which has been recognized in at least two American cases.5 1
The most troublesome group of cases in this class are the cases
in which the surety has made his undertaking without request by
the principal. The traditional view was that without request by
the principal no action at law for reimbursement would lie, 52 although some cases went very far in "implying" a request. 5 Without
a request, express or implied, the English view would leave the
surety without recourse because subrogation was permitted only
to the securities prior to statutory change of 1856 ;54 in the United
States subrogation would afford a remedy because it applied as
well to the main debt. 5 The modern view, advanced by the Restatement, is that unjust enrichment, following under proper circumstances from the surety's payment, entitles the latter to reimbursement. 56 It follows that the stand taken on this issue will
be decisive on the application of the statute to promises of indemnity made to a surety by a stranger where the surety is of the
"non-consensual" type. If there is no request, express or implied,
on the part of the principal to the surety, and the surety can recover from the principal in this particular jurisdiction only on
the theory of subrogation, it might well be said that a promise to
indemnify the surety is not "collateral," since the surety is subrogated to the main debt only upon payment (although with a
relation back effect) On the other hand, where a court adopts
the theory of unjust enrichment there is more reason to argue that
this obligation exists in conditional form upon the surety's undertaking and that a promise to indemnify the latter is therefore intrinsically "collateral." Again, the courts have not taken a clear
stand on the matter.
b) If the principal is under a duty to reimburse the surety, the
51 May v. Williams, (1883) 61 Miss. 125, 48 Am. Rep. 80; Anderson v.
Spence,
52 (1880) 72 Ind. 315, 318, 37 Am. Rep. 162.
1ndemmty Ins. Co. v. McClure, (1934) 191 Minn. 576, 254 N. W 913,
Arnold, Suretyship and Guaranty (1927) sec. 157, p. 249; Arant, Suretyship (1931) pp. 326, 323 note 12, Comment, (1934) 13 Tex. L. Rev. 143,
Note, (1918) L. R. A. 1918F, 709.
Under the very earliest view, there was required not only a request
by the principal but also an express promise to indemnify. See cases and
articles cited by Arnold, Suretyship and Guaranty (1927) sec. 154, footnote
3. Later the promise to indemnify was implied from the principal's request.
See 53
Decker v. Pope, (1757) 1 Selwyn N. P (13th ed.) 91.
See, for example, Hall v. Smith, (1847) 5 How. (U.S.) 96, 12 L. Ed.
66. But
54 see Holmes v. Knights, (1839) 10 N. H. 175.
Sheldon, Subrogation (2d ed. 1893) sec. 135.
55
Idem, sees. 136-138.
5
6See Restatement, Security, sec. 104 (2).
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promise by a stranger to hold the surety harmless would at first
blush seem in terms "collateral." However, because of the various
legal foundations and aspects of such duty to reimburse and the
difficulties which the courts have had with that question, some
further analysis is necessitated.
aa. In the first place, it should be recognized that the application of the statute of frauds to "indemity" agreements because
of the existence of a duty to reimburse by the principal is clearly
eliminated when the promisor receives an independent economic
advantage from his undertaking. The latter factor in and by itself
validates the oral contract. This is in accord with the reasoning
found in some better considered decisions. " And in addition thereto, a number of cases in which the courts have indiscriminately
refused to apply the statute to "indemnity" agreements are correctly decided on their facts because the economic advantage element was present though not properly evaluated by the judges. 8
bb. Much less convincing is a reason by which a few jurisdictions have explained the inapplicability of the statute to such agreements, viz. the absence of two concurrent obligations at the time
the agreement between the indemnitor and the prospective surety
was concluded. This argument is most forceful, of course, when
the promisee signs as surety in sole reliance on the indemnitor's
promise and without any request by the principal. It was in reference to this type of situation that the Court of Appeals of New
York made the following statement:
"It distinctly appears that the defendant [indemnitor] did and
that D [principal] did not, request the plaintiff to become surety.
It is of no importance that the act of the plaintiff resulted in a
5

7Smith v. Delaney, (1894) 64 Conn. 264, 29 At. 496, 42 Am. S. Rep.
181, Meinrath Brokerage Co. v. Collins-Dietz-Morris Co., (C.C.A. 8th 1924)
298 Fed. 377, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (C.C.A. 8th 1930)
41 F. (2d) 319; Mills v. Brown, (1860) 11 Ia. 314 (but with an alternate
holding that contracts of "indemnity" are not within the statute. This
latter is apparently the rule now applied in Iowa, regardless of the circumstances. See Kladivo v. Melberg, (1930) 210 Ia. 306, 227 N.W 833), Potter
v. Brown, (1877) 35 Mich. 274; Wahl v. Cunningham, (1928) 320 Mo. 57,
56 S. W. (2d) 1052; Kelsey v. Hibbs, (1862) 13 Ohio St. 340; Nugent v.
Wolfe, (1886) 111 Pa. St. 471, 4 At. 15, 56 Am. Rep. 291; see Hartley v.
Sandford, (1901) 66 N. J. L. 627, 630, 50 At. 454, 55 L. R. A. 206.
At least two cases, however, have erroneously applied this so-called
"main purpose" rule to indemnity agreements by confusing a legally
sufficient consideration with the necessary additional independent economic
advantage. Chapin v. Merrill, (1830) 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 657, Shook v. Vanmater,
(1868) 22 Wis. 507
58
Resseter v. Wraterman, (1894) 151 Ill. 169, 37 N. E. 875, Lucas v.
Chamberlain, (1848) 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 276; Hawes v. Murphy, (1906) 191
Mass. 469, 78 N. E. 109. See infra a discussion of the cases where the promisor is not independently liable.
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benefit to D, provided the promise was not collateral to any liability of the latter to the former. The obligation arising from payment
was, of course, subsequent to the engagement of the defendant, but
the promise undertaken for must be or become liable at the time
the promise is made. Where the promise does not relate to a precedent liability of the third person the question whether it is original
or collateral depends upon whether the third person incurred any
liability concurrently with the promisor."5
Similarly, Illinois has held that in the absence of an actual promise
by the principal to reimburse his guarantor the promise of indemnity by a third person is not collateral, even though after payment the guarantor might have had his action over against the
principal. 60 Indiana has taken an analogous position."'
The reasoning of these cases, however, which would lead to
quite unrealistic distinctions between "actual," "contingent" and
"prospective" liabilities, seems to be highly artificial and not in
consonance with the purpose of the statute. And a number of other
cases have made the point abundantly clear. Interestingly, it is an
earlier opinion by the New York court6" which apparently first
exposed the unsoundness of the approach by pointing out that under
ordinary circumstances the contracting parties are well cognizant
of the fact that payment by the surety will entitle him to reimbursement from the principal. The full inconsistency of the contrary position is illustrated by the result reached in the latest
New York case6 3 in point where the couft without hesitation held
that the indemnitor was originally liable on his oral promise but
was discharged on suretyship principles when the promisee released the main debtor. There are a number of well-reasoned decisions in other jurisdictions which have, like the earlier New York
case, clearly indicated that the contingent nature of the duty of
59
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Tighe v. Morrison, (1889) 116 N. Y. 263, 270, 22 N. E. 164, 5 L. R. A.

60

Resseter v. Waterman, (1894) 151 Ill. 169, 37 N. E. 875. For a later
pronouncement see Early v. Cassens, (1920) 216 Ill. App. 581.
62Anderson v. Spence, (1880) 72 Ind. 315, 37 Am. Rep. 162.
62
Kingsley v. Balcome, (1848) 4 Barb. (N.Y.) 131. This case overruled the earlier case of Chapin v. Merrill, (1830) 4 Wend. (N.Y ) 657
which erroneously had held the statute inapplicable whenever a separate
consideration supported the promise, and distinguished on the facts the
other previous New York case which dealt with the question-Harrison v.
Sawtell, (1813) 10 Johns. (N.Y.) 242, 6 Am. Dec. 337 Kingsley v. Balcoiie
was in turn repudiated by Tighe v. Morrison, loc. cit. supra note 59, and
the court retained this position in Jones v. Bacon, (1895) 145 N. Y. 446, 40
N. E. 216 on the grounds that it was not proper to reopen the question.
O3 Jones v. Bacon, (1895) 145 N. Y. 446, 40 N. E. 216. The court overlooked that this case was in reality the first case which was similar on its
facts to Kingsley v. Balcome, loc. cit. supra note 62.
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reimbursement by the principal does not prevent the promise by the
indemnitor from being collateral in contemplation of law
Of this group, the Ohio case of Easter v. White 4 is probably
the oldest and leading exponent. Judge Sutliff squarely and clearly
faced the crucial issue. Ingenious counsel had suggested that it
might be relevant to find whether the principal was already indebted to the main creditor or whether even this liability did not
exist at the time the indemnity agreement with the prospective
surety was made. It was ruled that this difference in the facts
would have no bearing on the decision.
"In either case the liability assumed by the surety is only to
the effect that the principal shall discharge his own duty, or pay his
own debt, and the principal is bound in law to prevent the liability
attaching to his surety; and if the surety shall be compelled to pay
the debt or suffer loss as his surety, then the principal is in law
bound to fully indemnify or remunerate him for the same. It is,
therefore, evident that in either case, the promise to indemnify by
a third person to the surety is only collateral to the legal liability
of the principal to indemnify his own surety, and such third person
by such promise to indemnify is in the relation of surety for the
principal
in regard to his, the principal's, liability to indemnify the
8 5
surety."
It was followed for identical reasons by the Chancery Court of
Tennessee66 which emphasized that it made no difference in regard
to the "collateral" character of the indemnity agreement whether
the principal's duty of reimbursement resulted from a request by
him or by operation of law from the existence of the surety relationship. Equally thorough opinions reaching the same result have
been handed down in Missouri, 67 Mississippi " s and Pennsylvania. 0
The courts which thus oppose the later New York stand are definitely more realistic in their reasoning and sounder in their conclusions.
cc. Another line of cases holds the statute inapplicable on the
basis that the surety-promisee gave the "entire credit" to the
stranger-promisor. The most celebrated statement of this proposition was made by the New Hampshire court in Holnes v.
Knights :70
64(1861)
12 Ohio'St. 219.
65
Idem, p. 229.
86

6

Macey v. Childress, (1875) 2 Tenn. Ch. 438.
v. Britton, (1875) 59 Mo. 204, 21 Am. Rep. 379.

7BissIg

GSMay
v. Williams, (1883)
6

61 Miss. 125, 48 Am. Rep. 80.

gNugent v. Wolfe, (1886) 111 Pa. St. 471, 4 At. 15, 56 Am. Rep. 291.

70(1839) 10 N. H. 175. The case was later followed in Demeritt v.

Bickford, (1879) 58 N. H. 523.
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"If the plaintiff in fact relied upon the request and promise of
the defendant and the credit was given to him, it would be according to the truth of the case to hold that defendant's promise constituted an original liability "I'
The intrinsic difficulty, however, which the application of this
test encounters here is precisely whether it is possible, in contemplation of law, to give the "entire credit" to the promisor Since we
discuss a situation where the principal is liable for reimbursement
to the surety, the effect of this additional obligation upon the
assumption of the entire credit to the indemnitor presents the very
crux of the problem. The court recognized this argument but
countered with the proposition that such obligation did not prevent the promisee's relying wholly on the indemnitor inasmuch as
the principal's liability resulted from an implied promise only
A similar approach was taken in Massachusetts. In Chapm v
Lapham, T2 decided one year prior to the Holmes Case, Chief Justice Shaw, in ruling the statute inapplicable to a similar promise,
pointed out that the surety gave entire credit to the indemnitor, a
result which could and did follow even though the principal "may
have been himself liable incidently upon a promise implied by
law "73 Pursuant to this precedent, the Massachusetts court has
later7 1 predicated the exemption of "indemnity" promises from
the statute upon the factual question of whether the prospective
surety intended to rely exclusively upon this agreement with the
"indemnitor. ''7 5 A few other jurisdictions have followed the lead of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire without attempting any sort
6
of an analysis of the true problem.7
A purely rational approach leads one irresistibly to the conclu7Idem, p. 180.
72(1838)
20 Pick. (Mass.) 467
3
M
Idem, p. 471. It is to be noted that the Chapin Case on its facts could
correctly be decided. The principal being a minor and therefore under no
obligation to reimburse the surety, there was no other liability to which
that 74of the promisor could be "collateral."
Hawes v. Murphy, (1906) 191 Mass. 469, 78 N. E. 109.
75
The Massachusetts court, unlike that of New Hampshire, has not
concerned itself with the effect of the obligation on the part of the principal
to reimburse
the surety.
76
Calamita v. De Ponte, (1936) 122 Conn. 20, 187 At. 129; Wahl v.
Cunningham, (1928) 320 Mo. 57, 6 S. W (2d) 576, 67 A. L. R. 489; sec
Early v. Cassens, (1920) 216 Ill. App. 581.
These cases represent more or less the final pronouncement on the
present question in their respective jurisdictions. It might be noted that they
constitute an unfortunate shift from the position taken by the same courts
in earlier cases in which the "main purpose" rather than the "entire credit"
was treated as the decisive test for the exemption from the requirement
of a written promise. Thus, compare Smith v. Delaney, (1894) 64 Conn.
264, 29 At. 496, 42 Am. S. Rep. 181, Bissig v. Britton, (1875) 59 Mo. 204,
21 Am. Rep. 379.
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sion that the "entire credit" test can not be adapted to this type
situation. In our previous discussion 77 we traced the development
of this test and found that its only function was to establish that
one liability was created. The arguments of those courts which
have denuded New York's position 8 are equally as effective in
proving that all discussion of the "entire credit" test in connection
with so-called "indemnity agreements" is, from an historical standpoint, pure nonsense.
dd. Other reasons which have been advanced in holding the
statute inapplicable are even more spurious and can rather summarily be dismissed. Obviously a statement that such a promise
is not -within the statute because it is "a promise of indemnity"
admits of no virtue."9 Nor can any more be said for those cases
which argue that an indemnity agreement is a promise to the
"debtor" and not to the "creditor, 'so or that the statute applies
only when the main debt is in existence at the time of the promise s1
Finally, one case has boldly reasoned (in holding the statute inapplicable where it should have been applied) that the court should
"undertake to work out the rights of the parties as they may arise
in each case."8' 2

2) The second class of cases concerned with the applicability
of the statute of frauds to indemnity agreements deals with situations where the indemnitor is himself primarily or secondarily liable
for the principal obligation.
a) Again, the enforceability of an oral promise presents little
doubt if the circumstances are such that the indemnitor receives an
immediate economic advantage from his undertaking. A case which
well illustrates this point is Minck v. Huff 83 A ran a hotel, owning the furniture therein which was mortgaged to B. Both A and
B received about $200 a month income from the business. A was
7
' See the first chapter, (1946) 31 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 11-14.

7sSee supra notes 64 to 69 and text thereto.
79
Yet the statement is made by some of our most distinguished courts,
particularly the more recent decisions on the question. See, for example,
Keesling v. Frazier, (1889) 119 Ind. 185, 186, 21 N. E. 552; Kladivo v.
Melberg, (1929) 210 Ia. 306, 314, 227 N. W 833.
soSee Dyer -v. Staggs, (1927) 217 Ky. 683, 687-688, 290 S. W 494,
Aldrich
v. Ames, (1857) 9 Gray (Mass.) 76.
81
See Perley v. Spring, (1815) 12 Mass. 296, 299. The holding of the
court is adequately refuted in an annotation by Benjamin Rand following
D. N.82Tyng's report of the case.
Newbern v. Fisher, (1930) 198 N. Car. 385, 151 S. E. 875, 68 A. L. R.
345. Curiously, the court distinguishes its earlier decisions holding that the
statute encompassed "indemnity" promises on the grounds that there was
an independent economic advantage in those cases, labeled by the instant case
as "an axe to grind."
83(1894) 41 Neb. 516, 59 N. W 795.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

indebted to C on a note. To receive an extension A and B requested one D to sign a note, made by A payable to C, as cosurety
with B and promised to save D harmless. D had to pay the note
and sued B on the indemnity contract. The court in permitting
recovery simply stated that "indemnity contracts" are not within
the statute of frauds. While the reasoning-or lack of it-can not
be approved, the result reached is undoubtedly correct. B, the cosurety, retained his income as a consequence of the signature of
D and thus received an independent economic advantage which
removed his promise from the sweep of the statute. The correct
reason was given by the Michigan court in an analogous case.14
There a chattel mortgagee protected his mortgagor by signing a
replevin bond as a cosurety together with the plaintiff. The latter's
suit against the mortgagee on an oral promise of indemnity was
allowed because without plaintiff's co-signature defendant's security would have been worthless. The court intimated, however, that
even aside from the effect on the security the promise would not
have been collateral.
The majority of the cases holding the statute inapplicable to
the promise by a cosurety to indemnify which can be justified under the "main purpose" doctrine, however, take the approach of
the Minmck Case rather than the reasoned analysis of the Michigan
court.8 5
b) If there are no reasons present for the promise by one
cosurety to indemnify a prospective cosurety other than is wish
to assist the principal, the application of the statute again raises
problems. It should be obvious that the fact that the promisor is a
cosurety makes the entire credit test no more appropriate than
when he is a stranger 86 Some courts have just blandly stated that
the statute does not apply to variations of the liabilities of the
cosureties inter se.17 The only reason advanced 8 is that first mdi84Boyer v. Soules, (1895) 105 Mich. 31, 62 N. W 1000.
85
See for instance Sanders v. Gillespie, (1874) 59 N. Y. 250 (first
indorser assumed liability to pay note by oral contract with second endorser
in consideration of the delivery of certain goods. Upon payment, plaintiff was
entitled to enforce the agreement.) , Early v. Cassens, (1920) 216 Ill.
App.86581.
Contra (erroneously), Vogel v. Melms, (1872) 31 Wis. 306, 11 Am.
Rep. 87608. See supra text to note 77
Rose v. Wollenberg, (1897) 31 Ore. 269, 44 Pac. 382, 39 L. R. A. 378,
65 Am. S. Rep. 826, followed by Alphin v. Lowman, (1913) 115 Va. '141,
79 S. E. 1029, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 863. In Barry v. Ransom, (1855) 12 N. Y
462, the agreement was pleaded as a defense against action of contribution.
Judge Demo said that the statute did not apply to agreements between
cosureties, while Judge Dean took the view that the statute did not come
into 88operation where the agreement was pleaded as a defense.
Barry v. Ransom, (1855) 12 N. Y. 462.
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cated in Thonjnas v. Cook-that the cosurety did not promise to
pay the liability of another, but at least in part his own. Yet by
the same token, it can be said that since it is in part not his own
the statute is applicable. This view-taken by the Supreme Court
of Alabama 8 9-seems in accord with the purpose of the statute.
The most interesting situation arose in Tighe v. Morrison"
where a co-principal promised to indemnify the surety Since he
was dearly under an obligation to do so by operation of law, the
oral promise really did not add. It was no more than a promise to
pay his own debt. The court reached the correct result, but on
different reasoning.
To briefly summarize the foregoing breakdown, it follows that
the fact that a promisor is a person secondarily liable or a stranger
to the main transaction should have no effect per se on the applicability of the statute. Nor is there any rational merit in pigeonholing promises as "guaranty" or "indemnity"-a judicial approach induced by attempts at over-simplification by text writers
and compilators. Rather, every promise must be examined to see
if, from an historical viewpoint, it comes within the policy of the
statute. The case analysis has revealed that many opinions holding an "indemnitor's" promise enforceable have on their facts
reached the correct result. Indeed, the often-repeated rule that
"contracts of indemnity are not within the statute of frauds"
might well prove to be in itself the actual holding of a minority of
the courts if heed be given to sound distinctions in the particular
state's earlier decisions. Certainly until the statute is amended
by legislative process the rule of the Restatement is logically correct and supported by history
The record of the Minnesota Supreme Court on the question
is not particularly stimulating. The first case in point was Fidelity
& Casualty Co. v. Lawler9l where defendant had issued a counterbond to plaintiff promising to save him harmless from possible loss
as surety on a fidelity bond. The latter bond was renewed and extended to cover a different type of employment. Plaintiff surety
soPostem v. Clem, (1918) 201 Ala. 529, 78 So. 883, 1 A. L. RL 381.
The court summed up its position in the following words. "While our
Alabama case is classed by the text-writers as with the minority line of
decisions, we are disposed to follow same, and think

the

holding wholesome

and salutary as closing the door to confusion, fraud, and perjury by not
permitting cosureties on notes, bonds, and other instruments to promote
contests between themselves through oral promises and agreements as to
'their indemnity and liability."

90(1889) 116 N. Y. 263, 22 N. E. 164, 5 L. R. A. 617
93(1896) 64 Mfinn. 144, 66 N. W 143.
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alleged that defendant indemnitor knew of the extension and
agreed to continue on the counter-bond. After a defalcation by
the principal which the plaintiff was forced to pay, he brought this
action on the counter-bond. The Supreme Court, in affirming an
order of the trial judge overruling a demurrer to the complaint,
ruled that the counter-bond was a contnuing one. It is difficult
to see how the statute of frauds could have any application in such
case where the promise is in writing and continuing. Nevertheless,
prompted most probably by argument of counsel, 92 the court did
throw out the following language "The defendant's promise to
indemnify the plaintiff against loss by becoming responsible for
is not within the statute
[the principal's] faithful performance
of frauds." 9
The case of Esch v. White9 4 presented facts which justified a
discussion of the applicability of the statute to "indemnity" agreements. Here plaintiffs were sureties on an appeal bond and defendant was appellant's attorney Upon plaintiffs' refusal to justify,
defendant orally promised that if they would justify he would save
them harmless from all liability Justice Buck, who also wrote the
opinion in the Lawler Case, dealt principally with the issue of
whether there was a legally sufficient consideration for defendant's
promise, and only mentioned in the concluding sentence of the
opinion that such promise, having been made directly to the sureties,
was not within the statute of frauds. 5 Although it is to be re92
See the paper briefs to the case, Oct. Term. 1895, Cal. No. 251,
Appellant's Brief p. 18, and Respondent's Brief pp. 17-22. The issue to which
counsel were arguing, unappreciated apparently by the court, was whether,
if the counter-bond were not held to be continuing, the oral assurance of
defendant was within the statute. By the holding of the court this issue
obviously was never reached. Cf. infra note 200 and text thereto.
93
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Lawler, loc. cit. supra note 91, p. 148.
The case is further weakened by the authority cited for this proposition.
Cited is Goetz v. Foos, see supra note 5 and text thereto, and Browne, A
Treatise on the Construction of the Statute of Frauds (5th ed. 1895) sees.
161, 162. Mr. Browne, in the sections cited, lists Minnesota as a jurisdiction
holding "contracts of indemnity" not within the statute, relying for the
statement on Goetz v. Foos. The Goetz Case obvigusly does not stand for
this proposition, and the question was open in this state up to the Lawler
Case. One reaches the rather humorous result that the Minnesota rule on
the question was laid down in a case which did not raise the issue by reliance on erroneous authority.
94(1899) 76 Minn. 220, 78 N. W 1114. A later phase of the same case
can be found in (1901) 82 Minn. 462, 85 N. W 238.
95
Just as disturbing is the following statement of Justice Mitchell's
concurring opinion. "That the promise of defendant was not within the statute
of frauds is too well settled by the authorities to be now questioned." Idem,
p. 225.
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gretted that the court did not see fit to discuss the applicability of
the ftatute at length,"" the result can be justified on the grounds
that the promise gained for defendant an independent economic
7

advantage.9

The Minnesota court's final ruling on the question was in
Noyes v. Ostrum.a The promisee was induced, by the parol
promise of indemmty, to be a cosurety with the promisor on a
construction performance bond. On default of the principal the
sureties undertook completion of the contract and borrowed money
on their joint promise for that purpose from a partnership of
which promisor was a member. This suit was brought by the
partners against the promisee for a balance due on the note. Defendant promisee alleged the promise of indemnity as a defense.
Although the case was remanded to the lower court for necessary
eqtiitable relief, the court stated that the oral promise was not
within the statute, it being "an original promise for a sufficient
consideration." Furthermore, neither the Lawker or Esch Case is
cited; reliance is placed on decisions in which the "entire credit"
test had been applied.99 There being no indication on the facts in the
record that the promisor received an independent economic advantage, it would appear that the case is squarely contra to the
Restatement's position. Inadequacy of argument of counsel 00
might well explain the court's confusing position.
It is to be hoped that if the question again comes before our
court an analysis will be made along the lines here developed.
There appears to be no compelling reason why the rule of the Restatement should not be adopted to the effect that oral promises to
indemnify a surety are within the statute unless either there is no
duty to reimburse on the part of the principal or the promise was
made for the promisor's own economic advantage.
9GThe court had the benefit of excellent argument by counsel for the

defendant. See the paper briefs to the case, April Term 1899, Cal. No. 191,

Respondent's Brief pp. 19-26. In arguing for the applicability of the statute, counsel carefully points out that the announced rule in the Lawler Case
was no more than a dictum.
9
7See supra notes 57 and 58 and text thereto. Also Minnesota Annotations, Restatement of Contracts, sec. 186.
98(1910) 113 Minn. 111, 129 N. W 142.
99
Idem, p. 117.
0

oOnly counsel for the promisor argued the statute of frauds point-

to the effect, of course, that it was inapplicable. Neither of the two prior
cases were cited. See the paper briefs to the case, October Term 1910.
Cal. No. 109, Appellant's Brief pp. 25-26.
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B.
Promises to the Creditor Coupled with Extinguishment of tIhe
Debt Novations
It is obvious that if A's promise to C to pay B's debt to C becomes binding only upon the extinguishment of B's debt to C, then
there exists no other obligation to which A's can be "collateral" and
the statute of frauds would be inapplicable. Accordingly the Restatement of Security provides
"A promise that is itself accepted by the promisee in satisfaction of a previously existing duty of a third person to the promisee
is not within the Statute of Frauds." 101
We do not propose here to trace the history of the novation concept nor to discuss the ramifying problems involved.10 2 Rather, we
are interested primarily in determining precisely when our court
will consider the first debtor, B, to have been released by the
creditor, C.
Where the arrangement has been made between the creditor
and the promisor without the assent of the original debtor, the
general rule in Minnesota has been that no release and therefore
no novation is effectuated. The promise of the third person is consequently invalid for two reasons On the one hand it lacks a sufficient consideration unless such is present for other reasons. On the
other hand, the subsistence of the old debt brings the statute of
frauds into operation. Undoubtedly this situation is present when
the original debtor was neither present at the transaction between
the creditor and the new promisor nor was ever informed about it.
Illustrative of this principle is the lucid opinion of Justice Mitchell
in Johnson v Rumsey. °3 -In this case the evidence failed to show
that the original debtor was ever spoken to about the purported
novation, and consequently it was concluded that the discharge of
the debtor was "at most a mere mental operation," without the
necessary outward manifestation. Accordingly the court held the
promise of the defendant was "void, not only under the statute of
frauds, but on general principles of law, before we reach that
statute, as being a promise without consideration.'1

4

Apparently

it is not settled which side our court will take in the controversy
on whether or not a subsequent assent by the original debtor will
0

O'Restatement, Security, sec. 92. See also Restatement, Contracts. sec.

183.

02

1- See Ames, Novaton, (1893) 6 Harv. L. Rev. 184, 6 Williston. A
Treatise on the Law of Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) Clip. LV, pp. 5239 ft.
103(1881) 28 Minn. 531, 11 N. W 69.
10 4Idem, p. 534.
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constitute a ratification validating the whole agreement, at least it
should construe separate negotiations liberally as one continuous
transaction. 10 5 However, it has been held clearly in one instance"°
that the assent of the debtor, although beneficial, will not be presumed but must be explicitly manifested.
The interesting facts of that case indicate a reluctance on the
part of our court to infer the necessary elements of the ti-partite
agreement. Plaintiff visited his sick debtor to collect a note. Unable
to meet the demand the latter called for his father, the defendant.
Upon his arrival he promised to pay the debt of his son, who was
lying on the lounge too ill to participate in the conversation. Even
under these circumstances the court failed to find "any clear or
distinct promise on the part of the plaintiff to release the son.
concurred in or assented to by the same.11 7 It was therefore decided
,that the promise could not be supported as part of a novation nor
as additional obligation because it was oral and within the statute.
Other instances where a suit upon an oral promise failed because
of the non-compliance with the statute and the absence of the
necessary counter-promise of a release to effect a novation are the
cases of Gilles v. Mahoneyf01 and Nelson v. Larson.'09 In the latter
case the promise of a widow who had applied for letters of administration that she would pay an obligation of her deceased husband
if the creditor would forego the filing of the claim against the estate
was held unenforceable.
Where the court finds the necessary elements of a novation to
05
See Note, (1940) 124 A. L. R. 1498, 1502. While Minnesota has used
language to the effect that "the discharge of the old debt must be contemporaneous with and result from the consummation of an arrangement with

the new debtor," Cornwell v. Megins, (1888) 39 Minn. 407, 409, 40 N. W 610,
it might be doubted that the contemporaneous nature of all three mam-

festations must be taken too literally, particularly in the light of the much
more frequent indications that the absence of any assent by the debtor is
determinative. See Minnesota Annotations, Restatement of Contracts, sec.

427

It is to be doubted, however, whether our court will ever go so far as
to adopt the principle of an "equitable novation." See 2 Williston, op. cit.
supra06note 102, sec. 477
Hanson v. Nelson, (1901) 82 Minn. 220, 84 N. W 742.
107 1dem, p. 221.
108(1900) 79 Minn. 309, 82 N. W 583 (promise by a wife to pay her
husband's note).

109(1894) 57 Minn. 133, 58 N. W 687 It is to be noted that the court

made no reference to the fact that defendant might have had an "indepen-

dent economic advantage" inasmuch as she was heir to one-third of the
debtor's estate. This reason for holding the statute inapplicable on substantially identical facts (widow was sole heir) was adopted in In re

Hummels' Estate, (1893) 55 Minn. 315, 56 N. W 1064. See infra note 175
and text thereto.
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be present, however, the application of the statute is eliminated." 0
Certain difficulties arise when the new promise is in the form of
a negotiable instrument. 1 If such new promise is accepted "in
payment" of the original debt the statute of frauds is clearly no bar
to the enforcement, but the real trouble lies in the question of
whether payment by a stranger, like a promise to pay, requires
the assent of the original debtor to extinguish the debt.1" Where
assent is held necessary, a suit on the note might be defeated by the
defense of lack of consideration in a jurisdiction which takes the
view that an effective release and not merely a promise to release
was the consideration bargained for." 3 Moreover, the giving of a
negotiable instrument for an antecedent debt is not prima facie
payment of the debt but only a "conditional payment." '" 4 This rule
is applied both where a third person executes the note,10 and where
he simply adds his signature to the debtor's note," 0 which would
mean that the old debt subsists until the note is paid. Here again,
assent by the original debtor might be required-at least before
110 Yale v. Edgerton, (1869) 14 Minn. 194, McGahn v. Charles Weaver,
Inc., (1936) 198 Minn. 328, 269 N. W 830, 107 A. L. R. 1328.
"'We do not propose in this paper to investigate the problem of
whether, and under what circumstances, a negotiable instrument itself satisfies the requirement of a "writing expressing the consideration." On the
general problem see Moor v. Folsom, (1869) 14 Minn. 340, 100 Am. Dec. 227,
Peterson v. Russell, (1895) 62 Minn. 220, 64 N. W 555, 54 Am. S. Rep.
634, 29 L. R. A. 612.
11-The so-called "American Rule" is that a payment in cash operates
immediately to discharge the debt without the assent or ratification of
the debtor. See 6 Williston, op. cit. supra note 102. sec. 1858, 5 Page, The
Law of Contracts (2d ed. 1921) sec. 2821, Clark v. Abbott, (1893) 53
Minn. 88, 55 N. W 542, 39 Am. S. Rep. 577 Nevertheless, as the above
authors indicate, a few states still follow the "English" or "common law"
rule that the payment must be ratified by the debtor before he will be held
discharged, although the necessary ratification is generally found upon
"rather slight evidence." This latter rule is thus a precise application of the
novation requirement.
The difficulty which we encounter in finding a logical distinction insofar as the "assent" requirement is concerned between the "payment" and the
"novation" rules. A promise is obviously executory whereas a cash payment
is an executed act. But what of a negotiable instrument? The best solution
appears to be that of the Restatement of Contracts where the determining
factor is the discharge of the debtor by the creditor whether the consideration
given by the third person be a promise (sec. 428) or a payment or other
performance (sec. 421).
"'Of course, where the latter view is taken, a suit by the creditor
against the original debtor would give rise to the defense of a failure of consideration in an action on the note.
"14Devlin v. Chamblin, (1861) 6 Minn. 468, Geib v. Reynolds, (1886) 35
Minn. 331, 28 N. W 923, 6 Williston, op. cit. supra note 102, see. 1875F,
5 Page, op. cit. supra note 112, secs. 2813, 2814 and 2815.
11nHansen v Wilmers, (1925) 162 Minn. 139, 202 N. W 708.
11Mikolas v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 230, 180 N. W
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the final payment by the third person-in jurisdictions where the
strict novation principles are controlling."1 7 But aside from that
problem, it would be necessary to observe the requirements of the
statute of frauds insofar as they apply to negotiable instruments.
Curiously enough the problems discussed did not greatly disturb
Justice Berry in the only Minnesota case"" which has directly
presented them. Plaintiff had advanced transportation from Europe
to the woman who later became defendant's wife. After the marriage defendant gave plaintiff his note for this amount. The rule
controlling the disposition of the suit on the note was stated by the
Justice in the following words "If plaintiff took the note in satisfaction of Mrs. Sandberg's indebtedness to him, the satisfaction
was a 'harm' to plaintiff, furnishing a consideration for the note,
and the contract evidenced by the note would be not collateral, but
original, and therefore not within the statute of frauds."
C.
PROMISES TO THE CREDITOR WHICH CREATE AN ADDITIONAL

INDEPENDENT RGHT

BuT

MERELY IN COMTEMPLATION

OF ANOTHER DEBT" FIDELITY INSURANCE.

There is one group of cases left to be discussed, according to
the introduction of section 1 of this chapter," 9 in which the statute
has been held inapplicable by some courts despite the fact that the
contract is made with the creditor and is not coupled with an extinguishment of the principal obligation. These involve promises
which according to their terms have been thought to be "original,"
viz., the fidelity guaranty and insurance cases.
The basis of their exemption is by no means well established.
In fact, the Restatement 0 ° takes the view that the statute of
frauds should properly cover them. The opposite view could be
predicated upon one of two reasons It could be argued that where
fidelity guaranty is undertaken as a business the premium which
covers the risk constitutes an independent economic advantage sufficient to take the contract out of the sweep of the statute as a special
application of the main purpose rule. Or, without regard to the
consideration involved, it could be said that the promise to guaran117See supra note 112.

=8Holm v. Sandberg, (1884) 32 Minn. 427, 21 N. IV 416. The case was
relied upon in the later case of D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Doherty, (1888) 38
Minn. 430, 38 N. W. 111, wuch on its facts might have raised the problems.
However,
the statute of frauds was not mentioned by the court.
" 9 See supra, p. 634.
0
12 See Restatement, Security, sec. 93 (2),

Restatement, Contracts, sec.
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tee the fidelity of an employee is in terms not one to pay tile debt
arising from the employee's infidelity but is made only "in contemplation" of a loss flowing from such occurrence. It appears
that the latter reason is highly technical and unsatisfactory,12' and
that on sound principles a guaranty for faithful performance deserves as much the protection of the statute as any other guaranty
for payment or collection. Conversely, where the guarantor underwrites the fidelity of employees as a business for a compensation
calculated by an actuarial risk, this fact in itself might constitute
an acceptable reason for the enforceability of an oral underwriting
22
notwithstanding the position of the Restatement.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken the position that at
least the professional surety and fidelity contracts need not be
in writing to be enforceable. It repudiated defendant's argument
to the contrary with the words "We appreciate the force of the
defendant's contention but we hold that such a contract is a contract of insurance against loss through dishonesty of employees,
is an original undertaking, and is not within the statute of frauds
12
because not in writing.' 3
2.
Situations In Which the Statute of Frauds Is Not Applicable
Although the Promise Creates an Additional Independent
Right for the Creditor in Reference to the Debt.
Generally speaking, if the new promise creates an additional
independent right for the creditor in reference to the debt, the
statute of frauds is applicable. However, it has gradually become
recognized that the policy of the statute does not require its operation if the promisor contracted for an independent economic advantage to himself which minimizes the danger of the fraudulent
assertion of a promise. The historical development of this doctrine,
more popularly known as the "main purpose" rule, shows considerable uncertainty as to the ramifications. On the other hand, a num184. Accord, Commonwealth v. Hinson, (1911) 143 Ky. 428, 136 S. W 912,
L. R. A. 1917B, 139, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 291, 2 Williston, op cit. supra note 102,
sec. 472, pp. 1362-1363.
121If the new promise has "no reference" to the principal debt, except as
to the measure of damages, the statute is correctly deemed to be inapplicable.
Thus, in Towne v Grover, (1830) 9 Pick. (Mass.) 306, defendant promised
not to pay a certain carpenter without previous notice to plaintiff who
wished to attach this debt. It was held that the oral promise was enforceable,
the measure
of damages being the payment made in violation of the promise.
2
2Frost, A Treatise on Guaranty Insurance (1902) sec. 6.
123Quinn-Shepherdson Co.v. U. S. F & Guaranty Co., (1919) 142 Mim.
428, 433, 172 N. W 693.
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ber of situations have become typical in which the validity of the
oral promise is never questioned. We shall first investigate the
origin of the doctrine, then discuss the typical cases and finally
examine the exact scope of the general rule in our jurisdiction.
A.
The Origin of the So-called "Ma'ein Purpose"Doctrine.
The doctrine was apparently 2 4 initiated by Chancellor Hardwicke in Thomlinson v. Gill.12 5 In that controversy, defendant Gill
had promised that if the widow of the intestate would permit
him to be joined with her in the letters of administration, he would
make good any deficiency in the assets necessary to discharge the
intestate's debts. The Chancellor construed the transaction as a
promise made to the widow as trustee for the creditors to pay the
debts of the intestate. According to his opinion, such promise was
enforceable in equity, and the statute of frauds presented no
obstacle since the undertaking was supported by "quite a new distinct consideration." Assuming that the agreement by the general
creditors to let defendant share in the administration constituted
an independent economic advantage to the latter, the result reached
is fully in accord with the later stage of the doctrine despite the
objectionable language of the Lord Chancellor.
The next step in the evolution of the rule was W/illiams v.
Leper 2 -Although the bases of the judges' opinions vary cons.derably and are in many respects obscure, the result itself greatly
influenced the course of later adjudications in both England and
America. The facts were relatively simple. T, a tenant of W,
was in arrears with his rent for three quarters. He conveyed all
his assets for the benefit of creditors who employed L to sell them.
On the morning of the auction W came to distrain the goods
whereupon L promised to pay the arrears due W if he would desist
from distraimng. And the court held that this promise was enforceable.
Curiously enough the case of Thonlinson v. Gill was not cited
124Reference to Stephens v. Squire, (1696) 5 Mod. 205, 87 E. R. 610, is
made by Williams in a note (1 Williams' Saund. 211a) for the proposition

that if a promise is founded on some new consideration it ts an original
undertaking. That case, however, held only that a promise by one of several
joint debtors to pay the debt if a suit against all be withdrawn was not within
the statute. See argument of counsel in Williams v. Leper, loc. cit. infra note
126.

1:25(1756) Amb. 330, 27 E. R. 221.
126(1766) 3 Burr. 1896, 97 E. R. 1152, 2 Wils. (K.B.) 308, 95 E. R. 827.
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by either counsel or court. The emphasis was in distinguishing a
line of precedents where promises in consideration of forbearances
to sue by the creditor had been held to be within the statute. The
first case to that effect was handed down soon after the passage
of the statute of frauds, 127 and had been followed by a number
of intermediate cases.12 8 It might be noted that an apparent exception was formed by the determination in Read v. Nash'2" where it
was decided that a promise to pay a certain sum in consideration
of the withdrawal of an action for assault and battery against a
third person need not be in writing. But the true basis for this
result was the English view that before the actual verdict in favor
of the plaintiff a mere tort claim constituted no "debt."
In the Leper Case, Lord Mansfield too.k the position that the
statute was not applicable because the plaintiff had released an
existing lien and the payment was to be made out of the fund.
Judge Wilmot, on the other hand, was of the opinion that L
constituted himself the bailiff for W with respect to that portion
of the proceeds of the goods as was covered by the arrears, while
Justice Yates deemed the promise original because of the facts
and without further explanation. Justice Aston, again, relied on the
fund doctrine in deciding that L was not bound beyond the proceeds of the goods.
In the next case (at nisiprizis),"3° chronologically speaking,

plaintiff had released a repairman's lien on a carriage in reliance
on defendant's oral promise that he would pay the repair bill. although he was not the owner Lord Eldon relied on the Leper
Case in refusing to non-suit the plaintiff, holding that the release
of the lien was sufficient to take the undertaking out of the statute.
Yet the facts do not show that the release of the lien benefited
defendant in any way The last English case which preceded the
adoption of the doctrine in the United States is Castling 7,
Aubert.'2 1 In that case plaintiff held certain insurance policies issued to his principal. G, under a broker's lien. He also had accepted
certain commercial paper of G's. Defendant, as manager of the
insured, wished to obtain the insurance policies in order to collect on them. He promised plaintiff to pay certain sums as indem"'2Lee v. Bashpole, (1689) Comb. (K.B.) 163, 90 E. R. 406.
12SKing v. Wilson, (1732) 2 Stra. 874, 93 E. R. 908, Rotherv v. Curry,
(1749) Bull. (5th ed. N.P.) 281, Fish v. Hutchinson, (1759) 2 Wils. (K.B.)
94, 95 E. R. 704.
129(1751) 1 Wils. (K.B.) 305, 95 E. R. 632.
130 Houlditch v. Milne, (1800) 3 Espin. 86.
131(1802) 2 East 325, 102 E. R. 393.
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nity against his liability on the acceptances if plaintiff would
release the policies. Plaintiff did so but defendant refused to pay,
and in a suit on the promise all the judges held the defense of the
statute was unavailable. Lord Ellenborough pointed out that the
proceeds of the insurance policies by far exceeded the amount
defendant promised to pay, and, further, that in entering into the
undertaking defendant "had not the discharge of G principally in
his contemplation, but the discharge of himself." This case, then,
is the first which clearly emphasized the independent economic
interest in the promisor as the criterion for exempting the oral
promise from the statute.
It was to this stage that the English judges had developed the
"main purpose" doctrine when our American courts were called
upon to take their stand. And it was these early precedents, which
had conveniently been summarized in an elaborate note by Sarjeant
Williams following Saunder's report of Forth v. Stanton,'2a that
pointed the direction for our judges.
Chief Justice Kent's already discussed opinion in Leonard v.
Vredenburgh 33 is the most famous of those transplanting the
rule into our law. In his words, "If a promise to pay the debt of
another be founded on a new and distinct consideration independent of the debt, and one moving between the parties to the new
promise, it is not within the statute." In spite of later misconstruction of his words, there is no doubt but what the Chief Justice did
not mean that any legally sufficient consideration to support a
promise (such as a forbearance to sue the principal) would render
the statute inapplicable; his emphasis was that it had to be "moving between the newly contracting parties.13

4

Although the authors

feel that this statement of the rule, while using lawyer's language,
is commendable in its simplicity and clarity, it has given rise to
3
1 -See 1 Williams' Saund. 210. The note was written around 1800.
133(1811) 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 29, 5 Am. Dec. 317
' 34Some of the confusion is explained by the fact that the Chief Justice

spoke at another place in the opinion "of some new and original consider-

ation of benefit or harm moving between the newly contracting parties."
These words taken by themselves could lead the reader to include the cases
where the promisor obtained no benefit, such as the mere forbearance cases,

but the remainder of the opinion shows clearly that Kent did not mean that.
In fact the words "or harm" should be ignored since a harm moving between

the parties is hard to conceive. Certainly the whole tenor of the opinion

indicates that according to Kent not any legally sufficient consideration but
only an independent economic advantage of the promisor renders the statute
inapplicable. Cf. Burdick, Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds, (1920) 20
Col. L. Rev. 153, 164.
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many doubts, objections and modifications which cannot be iginored in a study of the present status of the doctrine.
Chief justice Savage "revisited" the subject 1" not long after
Chief justice Kent's pronouncement and concluded "In all these
cases founded upon a new and original consideration of benefit to
the defendant or harm to the plaintiff, moving to the party making
the promise, either from the plaintiff or the original debtor, the
subsisting liability of the original debtor is no objection to the
recovery " The Justice thus wished to emphasize that a new consideration beneficial and moving to the proisor was the essential criterion, thereby encompassing in the same class cases where
the consideration moved from the original debtor as well as those
where it moved from the promisee, but excluding the cases where
the consideration moved from the promisee but to the original
debtor
Next to New York, the Massachusetts development, particularly under the guidance of Chief Justice Shaw, most influenced
the American position. His opinion in Cahill v Bigelow which
did so much for the establishment of the "entire credit" test has
already been mentioned.1 36 Of equal importance for the adoption
of the "main purpose" rule is his opinion in Nelson v Bo.- noton.
This case was preceded by Stone v. Symmes 38 which should be
first noted because its facts serve to clarify the scope of the doctrine. There A, being indebted to B, had promised to work for
him as a carpenter in payment whenever B would call for in.
While A was employed by C, B requested the services. In order
to retain A's services, C promised B to pay A's debt and C thereupon did not call on A. The court refused to enforce C's oral
promise because of the statute of frauds for the reason that A
had only suspended B's debt. Justice Putnam, who wrote the
opinion, apparently felt that the retention of A's services was not
a benefit moving from the promisee. 'While the correctness of the
result might well be questioned, the case shows that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the economic advantage
moves "between the contracting parties," where this is a necessary
element of the test.
In Nelson v Boynton. which a distinguished author has called
135Farley v. Cleveland, (1825) 4 Cow. (N.Y.) 432, 15 Am. Dec. 387
lGSee supra, (1946) 31 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 17 where the case is discussed
by us in connection with the development of the entire credit test.
1:'7(1841) 3 Met. (Mass.) 396. 37 Am. Dec. 148.
1:31(1836) 18 Pick. (Mass.) 467
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the origin of the modern doctrine,

39

Chief Justice Shaw, although

approving of Kent's classification, stated the rule again in a slightly
different way: "Cases- are not considered as coming within the
statute, when the party promising has for its object a benefit which
he did not before enjoy, accruing immediately to himself, but
where the object of the promise is to obtain the release of the
person or property of the debtor, or other forbearance or benefit
to him, it is within the statute." In this version of the test, the
purpose or object of the promisor becomes determinative. Whether
this shift in approach was intended by Justice Shaw, and whether it
constituted an improvement which facilitates its application or
circumscribes the legitimate range of the exemption more justly,
is to us quite problematical. At any rate, it was the version wuch
became the "majority rule" and which was adopted by the Restatements,1 40 -with the further qualification that it is sufficient when
the consideration is desired "mainly" for the pecuniary or business
advantage of the promisor. The danger that fanciful "intents"
might underrmne the statute completely seems to have been obviated by the courts' reserving to themselves the question as to
what is a legitimate economic, pecuniary or business advantage
within the scope of this rule. Another modification which is introduced by Chief Justice Shaw's version of the test consists in the
effect that it is apparently no longer necessary that the independent
economic advantage move from the promisee as long as it moves to
the promisor which is the very point that apparently created an
obstacle for Justice Putnam.
In deciding what constitutes such an economic advantage that
the bargaining for it will take the promise out of the statute, the
different jurisdictions have manifested somewhat varying attitudes.
A few classes of transactions, particularly certain typical commercial agreements, have been generally recognized as being outside
of the statute. Beyond that each jurisdiction merits separate inquiry Consequently, we will discuss the Minnesota law, first under
the aspect of its harmony with the typified cases, and then proceed
to determine the general ramifications of the test. In this analysis
two basic problems have to be settled First, is it the intent of the
promisor or the actual effect of the transaction which controls
Secondly, is the economic advantage in question liberally or iarrowly conceived?
139Throop, Validity of Verbal Agreements (1870) sec. 596, p. 586.
14ORestatement, Security, sec. 93, Restatement, Contracts, sec. 184.
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B.
Typical Commercial Transactons tn Which the Statute Has Been
Held Inapplicable By Tradition Del Credere Guaranties
and Assignor's Guaranty of an Assigned ?tght.
The two typical commercial transactions mentioned in the
caption have been held outside the scope of the statute by wellestablished tradition. The Restatements recognize this fact by specifically providing
"A promise by the assignor of a right that the obligor of the
assigned right will perform his duty is not within the Statute of
Frauds.""'
"A guaranty by a factor to his principal that a purchaser of
the principal's goods through the agency of the factor 2will pay
the price of them is not within the Statute of Frauds."''
1. The genealogy ot the del credere cases is well-documented.
At the time of Lord Mansfield it was decided that a del credere
commission made the broker primarily liable to the principal and
that the liability of the party to the contract concluded with the
aid of the broker was only subsidiary The case which laid down
this rule'4 3 concerned the nature of the liability of an insurance
broker holding a del credere commission from his correspondents
(the insured) on the policies thus issued. This analysis of the
legal relation between the parties naturally excluded the applicability of the statute of frauds upon the agreement between the
broker and his mandator Put subsequently the erroneous characterization of this phase of the tripartite arrangement became recognized, and it was held by Lord Ellenborough that ordinarily the
liability ot the broker or factor on his del credere commission is
that of a guarantor and not of a principal. He first distinguished'44
and later overruled' 4 5 Lord Mansfield's decision because it appeared "to reverse the relative positions of principal and factor
and to have a tendency to introduce uncertainty and confusion into
the law on the subject." This reversal of position precipitated the
problem of the applicability of the statute of frauds to the dei
credere guaranty of brokers and factors. As to this particular point,
' 41 Restatement, Security, sec. 97 See also Restatement, Contracts, sec.

189(1) 2

I4 Restatement, Security, sec. 98. See also Restatement, Contracts, see.
189(2).
143
Grove v. Dubois, (1786) 1 T. R. 112, 99 E. R. 1002.
144Koster v. Eason, (1813) 2 M. & S. 112, 105 E. R. 324.
14.rMorris v. Cleasby, (1816) 4 M. & S. 566, 105 E. R. 943. This rulinii
was approved in a scholarly opinion by Justice Story sitting on circit in
Thompson v. Perkins, (1823) Fed. Cas. 13,972, 3 Mas. 232.
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the American decisions preceded the English ruling, the first case
being the Massachusetts decision in Swan v. Nesnmthi' by Chief
Justice Parker. He declared that it was nowhere required that a
guaranty of this nature should be in writing, since the liability was
admitted to be original, and therefore held the oral promise enforceable. It was followed by Judge Cowen in the New York case
of Wolff v. Koppel.147 While the effect of the Massachusetts precedent was.great, some additional reasons were sought by the Judge.
He argued that the transaction in substance amounted to a promise
not to sell except to persons absolutely solvent and that the debt
of another "came incidently as a measure of damages." ' The
American precedents appeared to be sufficiently persuasive even
in England, and it was there likewise held ii Couturier v. Hastieo
that the oral guaranty under a del credere commission was valid
because the immediate object for which the extra compensation
to the broker is given is not his liability to pay the customer's
debt but his taking greater care in sales to the customers and the
preclusion as to all questions of negligence in their selection. The
English cases which initiated the main purpose rule were cited by
analogy without further elaboration of the reasoning."'
In Minnesota. the rule of the Restatement is borne out by at
least one case, while a few others raise certain doubts. The problem was first presented to our court in Nichols v. Allen. a case
twice before the highest tribunal. It first came up on demurrer."'
The complaint alleged that defendant had sold and assigned to
plaintiff for value two promissory notes made by one R and guaranteed the collection of the note by an endorsement upon the same
to that effect, but without designating the consideration. The court
sustained the demurrer because it did not appear that the note
was not collectible, but added obiter that the statute of frauds
would not have applied since a new and original consideration between guarantor and guarantee could be assumed from a fair coi146(1828) 7 Pick. (Mass.) 220, 19 Am. Dec. 282.
147(1843) 5 Hill (N.Y.) 458, aff'd by the Court of Errors. (1845) 2
Den. (N.Y.) 368 for the unsatisfactory reason that the factor is the principal.
148This argument amounts in reality to a nice example of judicial
sophistry. Of course, it-could be said with respect to any guaranty that it is
a promise that the principal will not default, and that the debt comes in as
a measure of damages.
149(1852) 8 Ex. 40, 155 E. R. 1250, rev'd on other grounds (1853) 9 Ex.
102, aff'd
(1856) 5 H. L. Cas. 673, 10 E. R. 1065.
-0 Later English cases have approved Couturier v. Hastie. See Fleet v.
Murton, (1871) 7 L. R. Q. B. 126, 133; Sutton & Co. v. Grey, (1894) 1 L.
Martin, (1902) 1 L. R. K. B. 778.
R. Q. B. 285; Harburg India Rubber Co. A%
s'-(1875) 22 Minn. 283.
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struction of the complaint. Nevertheless, when the controversy
reached the court again,15 the order of the trial judge denying
recovery because of non-compliance with the statute of frauds
was affirmed. The evidence showed that defendant had acted as
agent of plaintiff in the sale of a threshing machine receiving a
commission. The guaranty of the notes which were made out to
the order of defendant was given in connection with the sale. While
the facts of the case create doubts whether a del credere conmission was agreed upon by the parties, it is astounding that the court
did not even discuss this possibility Even more amazing is the
fact that the obiter dictum in the first case and not the holding of
the subsequent decision has been cited in later cases.
In Sheldon v Butler"' the court was confronted with a guaranty made in respect to a promissory note which was given by a
commission agent pursuant to a stipulation that in substance
amounted to a del credere agreement.' 4 The statute of frauds was
held inapplicable, but the court relied on the assignment cases
rather than on the del credere cases. It remained once again for
the legal insight of Justice Mitchell to clearly recognize that a
contract of similar terms really involved a del credere guaranty
and was therefore outside the scope of the statute. 55 Curiously
enough. the court below refused even to admit the del credere
agreement in evidence. Justice Mitchell did not content himself
to rule that such evidence is admissible since it destroys the applicability of the statute, but went off on the somewhat inconsistent
ground that it was admissible because the words "for value received" complied with the mandate of the statute.
2. The assignment cases, which is the other group the Restatement mentions separately, are likewise a well-recognized category
Again, while they are in reality a special application of the mdependent economic advantage rule, some courts have endeavored
to find some separate reasons for their privileged status. As a leading text-writer on the subject has observed," 0' the rules pertainmg to the oral validity of guaranties in connection with assignment of rights for valuable consideration are principally due to
152(1877) 23 Minn. 542.
1.3(1878)
24 Minn. 513.
.4 The agent had promised "to sell
parties" and to indorse a purchaser's
consider such purchaser responsible.
155D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Baker,
57 Am.
Rep. 55.
' 6 Throop, op. cit. supra note 139,

such machines to none but responsible
note in case the plaintiff should not
(1885) 34 Minn. 307, 25 N. W 606,
pp. 640 ff.
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American adjudications, independent of English precedents, conimencing in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century
The leading Minnesota case on the subject is undoubtedly Wilson v. Hentes,,1

57

where again Justice Mitchell spoke for the

court. In this case A held a contract for the manufacture of certain
goods according to specifications. He sold his rights under this
contract and guaranteed orally its performance by the manufacturer. The court permitted recovery on the guaranty, although it
recognized that the basis for the exemption from the requirement
of a writing was doubtful. Justice Mitchell reviewed the various
theories extant and, after criticizing the tests laid down by Chancellor Kent and Chief Justice Shaw as too indefinite, apparently
approved the view that a guaranty under these circumstances
amounted to a mere contractual extension of the warranties implied by law and was in substance a promise to pay the guarantor's
own debt. He concluded that in any event the doctrine was too
well established to be questioned.
3. We feel it appropriate to mention here a third type of guaranty which, while not falling precisely within these two classes
recognized separately by the Restatement, is sufficiently related to
justify an extension of the exemption from the required writing.
This of course means also that they come within the general main
purpose rule. These cases involve a guaranty executed by an agent
to whom money was entrusted for a particular form of investment
in order to obtain a ratification of an actual or alleged deviation
from his instructions. The most important Minnesota case involving these facts is Crane v. Wheeler'58 which is particularly
interesting in that Chief Justice Gilfillan relied on the main purpose
rule despite the previous criticism by Justice Mitchell. The Crane
Case has recently been followed under similar circumstances.'9
4. While objections have been made to the reasoning of judges
who have twisted guaranties into promises of something else, with
the payment coming in as measure of damages,""0 it should also be
clearly understood that not every promise of payment in connection
with the transfer of a right is therefore a guaranty. This is specifically recognized by the Restatement which provides .-161
157 (1882) 29 Minn. 102, 12 N. W 151.
15S(1892) 48 Minn. 207, 50 N. W 1033.
15 9
Wigdale v. Anderson, (1935) 193 Minn. 384, 258 N. W 726.
3GOSee supra note 148.
16
Restatement, Security, sec. 99. See also Restatement, Contracts, sec.
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"A promise to purchase a right which the promisee has or niay
acquire against third persons is not within the Statute of Frauds."
Similarly not a guaranty, but at best a pledge in substance, is an
agreement to transfer coupled with a promise to repurchase after
a period. 16 2 The same can be said of an agreement for the rescission
of the sale of a right transferred pursuant thereto in the event that
it becomes valueless.' 63 And least of all a guaranty is the promise
to reimburse a third person for paying a note owed by the promisor 164 In these situations there simply is not a guaranty involved,
in distinction to the other cases in this subsection and those which
are to be discussed in the following which concern promises to pay
the debt of another, they being outside the statute because of the
nature of the consideration.
C.
General Scope of the Independent Economic Advantage
Doctrne itn Minnesota.
Outside of the two typical commercial transactions discussed
in the subsection immediately above, the main purpose rule has
been invoked in a number of situations which have frequently
recurred in the various jurisdictions. Without purporting to give
a complete list, we mention
1) Promises in consideration of the release of, or failure to
perfect, a lien on assets in which the promisor is beneficially interested.
2) Promises in consideration of the continuation to furnish
supplies to a contractor made by the owner of the building or a
surety on a contractor's bond which otherwise would not cover the
items.
3) Promises in consideration of the continuation to render
services or furnish supplies to a corporation in which the promisor
is beneficially interested as principal stockholder, creditor or
otherwise.
4) Promises to pay the debts of an estate to which the pronisor
is the successor.
It should be noted, however, that under certain conditions the
validity of the oral promise to pay for future deliveries or serv162First State Bank v. First State Bank, (1925) 165 Minn. 285, 206 N. W
459.

163 Peoples State Bank v Drake-Ballard Co., (1925) 164 Minn. 175,
205 N. W 59.
1O4Timm v. Aiton, (1921) 150 Minn. 450, 185 N. W 510.
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ices should be predicated on the "entire credit" test rather than on
the independent economic advantage doctrine. This would be the
case when the promisee was not already under a legal liability to
another person to furnish these supplies or services and the new
transaction was not understood to principally engage such third
person. For the attorney preparing his case, it is important that
he carefully distinguish these two theories, particularly since their
scope seems to fuse in some of these transactions. But insofar as
the oral promise pertains to already-furnished supplies or services
for which a third person is principally liable, the independent economic advantage rule would be the correct and only basis for its
enforceability.
In these cases the principal difficulties are really not presented
by the statute of frauds, but by the doctrine of consideration. Suppose A, a builder, promises orally to C, a supply house owner, that
he would see that C gets paid for all supplies already or in the
future to be delivered to B, a contractor whose credit is impaired,
for the construction of A's house. If it is intended that with repect to the future supplies A alone is liable no question exists as
to the sufficiency of the consideration or the validity of the oral
undertakdng. But how with respect to a promise of payment already due for supplies furnished up to the time of the promise"'
And what is the effect of A's promise, if he intends to be a mere
surety for the future deliveries, assuming that there is or is not
a defense for C on his existing contract with B ? Is the advantage
for A flowing.from C's going on with the contract a legally sufficient consideration? Is it of the type to warrant an exemption from
the statute? The hypothetical example shows that a careful reading of the cases is necessary in order to appreciate the true issues
presented.
1. The so-called lien or security cases, among which the English
decision of Williamn v. Leper, discussed above, is the leading precedent, have presented the least doubt. If the promisor possesses a
recognized beneficial interest in the property as owner, as junior
lienor or-by liberal interpretation-as future heir, the enforceability of his ora1 prormse can be justified as being in accord with
the underlying policy of the statute. If such an interest is not
present, the forbearance of enforcement, release or surrender of
the promisee's lien to the debtor will constitute a sufficient consideration for the pronuse, but it must necessarily fall because of
the statute.
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Minnesota has followed these rules. The first decision in which
the statute was held inapplicable because the relinqushment of a
possessory lien constituted an independent economic advantage to
the promisee was Walsh v. Kattenburgh,105 to which we have made
reference before. Defendant had purchased certain logs from one
Casey which were in the possession of plaintiff and covered by a
logger's lien in his favor The evidence showed two verbal promises
-one to Casey to pay his debt to plaintiff as part of the purchase
price of the logs, and one to plaintiff to pay the amount clue in
consideration of his delivering up possession of the logs. The court
held that the promise to Casey was void under the statute but that
the subsequent promise to plaintiff was enforceable. Since an independent economic advantage (the possession of the logs free of
the lien) moved to the promisor, the decision is undoubtedly correct although the court did not specifically spell out this reason.
The case is subject to criticism, however, on its dictum that the
first promise was unenforceable.1 61 Assuming that plaintiff was
bound by his promise to Casey as part of the stipulated compensation, the validity of the oral promise to plaintiff could also have
been predicated on the further rule that a promise to a creditor to
pay him a debt already owed him by the promisee is not within the
statute.''
Most illustrative of all Minnesota cases on the "main purpose"
rule is that of I-fodgins v Heaney0 s which was decided seven
years after the Walsh Case. The essential facts were as follpws A
held a conveyance to B's land which was in fact a mortgage and
subject to an action to .be declared such. C was entitled to a
materialman's lien on B's land and also held an execution lien for
printer's costs and sheriff's fees, both being prior to A's mortgage.
In consideration that C would release his lien, pay the sheriff's and
printer's costs and furnish B certain lumber for fencing the lot, A
promised he would pay the sum then due C for lumber and material. C brought suit on the oral promise. The court reversed a dismissal stating that the first two elements of the consideration were
of the kind to take the agreement out of the statute of frauds. With
respect to the third element, the court commented "As to the
fencing, however, the effect of the promise alleged, being to pay
the debt of another, it would be going too far to say that there is
165(1863) 8 Minn. 127
16GSee supra text to note 23.
167See infra, text to note 197
168(1870) 15 Minn. 185. For a later phase of the case see (1871) 17
Minn. 45.

SURETYSHIP ArD STATUTE OF FRAUDS

evidence tending to show that the leading object of defendant in
making it was to subserve or promote some interest or purpose of
his own, and that therefore it is valid though not in writing."
The import of this last statement is troublesome in several respects. In the first place, from the statement of the facts it cannot
be ascertained whether the relief demanded included the money for
the fence, which was not "then" due at the time of the stipulation.
Secondly, it remains obscure whether the court meant that the
invalidity of this portion of the agreement could entail a reduction
of the amount recoverable even if the amount of the fence was not
included in the complaint. Finally, the court failed to indicate how
the evidence showed that the fencing of the premises was not
bargained for by the defendant as a leading object of his own,
unless his interest as mortgagor was in fact too tenuous or remote.
It should be mentioned that in one case the court, at least by
dictum, stated that the mere release of a lien by the promisee is not
sufficient to overcome the applicability of the statute unless the
promisor is economically benefited thereby.' 69 Likewise an oral
promise by a surety to release a lien will not support a claim
for reimbursement if the creditor had unsuccessfully foreclosed
70
the lien before resorting to the surety.Y
2. Apparently only one case'' falling in the class of the construction cases has come before our Supreme Court. The facts
were that M, as contractor, had agreed with N, the owner, to
erect a certain building. M entered into an agreement with a materialman, A, that the latter should furnish the materials, a portion
for a lump price and the rest for a "fair market price." After A
had furnished a part of the materials, MNfand N cancelled their
contract. N thereupon agreed with A that he would stand in M's
place and that A should continue his deliveries. The court permitted a personal judgment aamnst N for all materials delivered,
stating that the statute of frauds was no obstacle since the contract
was made "upon a fresh consideration, viz., that plaintiffs would
go on, and.furnish the unfurnished remainder of the materials not
furnished to M, to him, and in legal effect, release their right to a
lien for the materials which had been so furnished to M." This
reference to a "release" as part of the consideration is puzzling
because the facts of the case show dearly that the plaintiffs tried to
assert the lien for the materials furnished to Mf but failed because
1690Dufolt v. Gonnan, (1857) 1 Mim. 301, 66 Am. Dec. 543.

17 Bruce v. Walters, (1930) 180 Minn. 441, 445, 231 N. W 16.
17'Abbott v. Nash, (1886) 35 Minn. 451, 29 N. W 65.
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of their omission to file their contract with M-which the oral
agreement did not prevent them from doing.
3. In regard to the cases relating to guaranties of corporate
debts by stockholders and creditors, two Minnesota cases are pertinent. In the first17" the court permitted a recovery on an oral
guaranty of plaintiff's salary if she would continue to work for a
corporation in which defendant was substantially interested as
guarantor and further unspecified manner The court evaded the
question of whether there was a sufficiently direct economic advantage by invoking the entire credit test despite the fact that
plaintiff had first tried to collect from the corporation.
In the other case,1 7 3 plaintiff was in the employ of a company
of industrial counsellors, the long term contracts of which defendant discounted. By defalcations of an employee of the company, $59,000 worth of spurious contracts were discounted with
defendant-an amount in excess of the company's assets. Defendant forced the company into receivership, and at the receiver's
sale bought up all of the assets and good will. The purchase was
made pursuant to an agreement between plaintiff, defendant and
another to continue the business in operation, with profits first
going to pay off defendant's claim and later to be divided three
ways. In order to induce plaintiff to agree to this proposition and
stay on with the company, defendant promised to pay him the
commissions owing him by the company at the time of the collapse.
The venture having failed because of unexpected federal legislation.
plaintiff sued on the oral promise to which defendant pleaded the
statute of frauds. The trial court's holding that the defense was invalid was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Justice Holt pointed out
that there was a "fresh consideration" for defendant's promise in
the form of an expectation of recouping the $59,000 loss. The fact
that defendant actually never realized the full economic advantage
trom plaintiff's performance was held immaterial in view of the
fact that plaintiff "did continue to sell contracts for the defendant'"
account." In the words of the court, the success of the business as
anticipated "was not a condition precedent to the agreement to pay
the company "1174
plaintiff what he had coming from
1t-Conrad v. Clarke, (1909) 106 Minn. 430, 119 N. W 214. 482. See the
discussion
supra (1946) 31 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 28.
73
1
SmIth v. Minneapolis Securities Corp., (1942) 211 Minn. 534. 1 N.
W (2d)
841.
i 7 4 See excellent notes on the validity of a stockholder's oral pronise
to pay a corporate debt in (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1198, (1928) 52 A. L. R. 787
(including also promises by officers and directors), supplemented in (1930)
67 A.L. R. 506.
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4. The Minnesota court has tvice passed on the validity of an
oral promise by an heir to pay a debt of the estate. In In re Hunintels
Estate'75 a surviving widow promised to pay a note her husband
had executed to plaintiff on consideration that plaintiff forbear from
filing his claim against the estate. After noting that the widow was
"sole heir" and that the estate was large enough to satisfy the
note, the court concluded that there was a "new and original"
consideration validating the promise. Although there is no clear
expression of the main purpose rule nor citation of any authority
in the opinion, there is little doubt but what the court was m fact
applying it. The second case,'" 0 decided the next year, involved
substantially identical facts except that the widow was only a onethird heir.1 77 Nevertheless, the court, completely overlooking the
possible economic advantage to the widow and without mention
of the HumtlCal se, held the promise unenforceable.""8
5. While the four categories discussed before can be looked
at as almost typical transactions in which courts of many jurisdictions have considered the scope of the independent economic
advantage rule, Minnesota furnishes some less typical, but just
as important, instances in which the ambit of this doctrine -as
in issue.
Our court has correctly excluded from this rule the cases where
the consideration supporting the promise was a mere forbearance
-to sue the principal without economic benefit to the guarantor. Thus,
an oral promise by a wife to pay her husband's note if the creditor
would not trouble her husband was not enforceable in the absence
of any showing "that the wife had any interest in the payment of
the note, that she would be benefited thereby."'" 9 Mere family relationship between guarantor and principal is not a sufficient reason
to validate an oral promise even where forbearance to proceed
against the latter would constitute sufficient consideration ;1so nor
is the mere intent to accommodate an employer' 68 or a customer.' 8175(1893)
55 Minn. 315, 56 N. VN. 1064.
70
1 Nelson v. Larson, (1894) 57 Minn. 133, 58 N. W 687 This case is
discussed supra note 109 and text thereto.
7"'This information was obtained from the paper briefs.
178A

possible explanation is the fact that plaintiff's theory apparently was

that a9novation had been concluded.

"1 Gilles v. Mahoney, (1900) 79 Minn. 309, 82 N. W 583. In a case
where a wife executed her own note in return for the past due note of her
husband, the court felt no necessity for even mentioning the statute. See

D. M.8 Osborne & Co. v. Doherty, (1888) 38 Minn. 430, 38 N. W 111.
1 0Cf. Blodgett v. Hollo, (1941) 210 Min. 298, 298 N. W 249.
28sHall v. Oleson, (1926)
168 Minn. 308, 210 N. W 84. The court here
found82that the statute had been complied with.
Linder v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., (1893) 52 Minn. 304, 54 N. W 95.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

While mere forbearance from suing the principal does not constitute an independent economic advantage which will take the
promise out of the statute, the withdrawal of a suit against the

promisor apparently is a benefit sufficient to validate an oral
guaranty This latter was recognized by our court in Bean v
Lainprey'83 in which defendant was sued on a guaranty to pay for
medical services rendered to his daughter A former suit against
the father had been withdrawn upon a part payment. Since plamntiff in this suit did not succeed in proving a promise to pay the
balance made in connection with this withdrawal, but only promises
to that effect made after the withdrawal, the statute was held to be
a bar to their enforcement.
Undoubtedly the two leading modern cases bearing oii the
scope of the independent economic advantage rule in our jurlsdiction are The Marckel Co. v. Raven"'4 and Rolfsinever v Ralt.'"' In
the first case plaintiff company had sold and installed a heating
plant in a house pursuant to a contract with defendant's son-mn-law
who held a contract for deed, defendant having legal title. The
son-in-law moved to Chicago and failed to make his payments to
plaintiff. When plaintiff threatened to retake the heating plant
defendant orally promised to pay for itifplaintiff would desist
from its plan to repossess, since its presence in the house would
give her a better chance to sell it. The court held defendant liable
on her oral promise. While some of the language of the opinion,",
could easily give the impression that the mere forbearance by the
creditor to enforce his claim against the principal constituted a
sufficient ground to hold the oral guaranty valid, the court was
correct in emphasizing at another place that the economic advantage which the guarantor derived from the agreement was the
opportunity to dispose of her house on more favorable terms.
In Rolfsmnever v. Rau defendant's husband had pledged to plaintiff promissory notes of strangers of a face value between $2500
and $3000 as security for a loan of $1500. Defendant approached
plaintiff and asked for permission to try the collection of these
notes. Plaintiff agreed to surrender them in return for her promise
to return the notes within ninety days or pay her husband's debt.
1s3(1901) 82 Minn. 320, 84 N. NV 1016.
184(1932) 186 Minn. 125, 242 N. W 471.
s5 (1936) 198 Minn. 213, 269 N. W 411.
Is8"If [defendant] chose to pronise to vay it. as the jury found that
she (lid, to avoid legal proceedings on plaintiff's part, her pronise was direct
upon sufficient consideration and not a collateral undertaking to pay the
debt of Purdy within the meaning of the statute." Idem, p. 127
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In an action on her promise after failure to return the notes, the
jury found for plaintiff and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's denial of her motion for judgment or a new trial. The
reasoning of the opinion merits close attention. Justice Hilton
posed the crucial issue in this manner "Did the appellant, for a
'fresh consideration' enter into an original undertaking with plaintiff, or was her promse collateral to the original debt ?" The answer
according to the learned judge depended upon "the intention on
the part of the appellant to enter into an original undertaking,"
which was a proper question for the jury In discussing whether
the finding of the jury to that effect was justified, the court pointed
out that "because of the relationship of the original debt [ -] to
the promisor, plaintiff was warranted in believing that appellant
made the promise as a primary one" and that it "was reasonable for
plaintiff to suppose that appellant had a beneficial interest in the
notes representing an amount of money equal to almost twice that
of the original debt." It is in many respects hard to believe that
the court meant what it said, and the statements seem to reveal
a confusion between the entire credit test and the main purpose
doctrine. While in the former the intent of the parties is determinative and is a question for the jury, it is, to say the least, questionable that the application of the latter depends on a finding
by the jury that the pronusor intended to enter into an original
undertaking. It is debatable whether and to what extent the manifested intent of the parties should control the application of the
statute of frauds under these circumstances, but certainly no court
should go ever beyond the Restatement which dispenses with the
writing if the consideration for the promise was in fact or apparently desired for his own pecuniary or business advantage."'The true province of the jury in such case depends on a correct
definition of the rule. Whether an economic advantage is sufficiently direct and substantial to dispense with the application of
the statute is a question of law; whether such advantage was actually bargained for or whether the promisee was warranted to
consider it as the object of the bargain is a question of fact. If the
mere opportunity of the wife to collect the notes of her husband
without a right in her to keep a portion of the proceeds can be
considered as independent economic advantage to her, the result
reached is correct; but if such right is required, it is difficult to
see why the juny was "justified" in finding that the promisee could
reasonably assume its existence. At any rate, the decision mdi287 Restatement, Security, sec. 93; Restatement, Contracts, sec. 184.
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cates that Minnesota follows the liberal trend incorporated in the
Restatement. Upon this basis the decision in another case 88 may
be explained. In that case a written guaranty did not comply with
the statute because of a failure to state the consideration, but it
was held enforceable with court not even alluding to this possible
defect.
3.
Situations n Which the Statute is Not Applicable Because the
Promise Creates in Substance No New Liability of the
PromisorIn Reference to the Debt.
Since the statute of frauds is primarily designed to accord protection against manufactured or improvident charges, the mischief
which the legislature wished to eliminate is not present if the
promisor's liability exists independently of his promise. The Restatement, under the heading "Promise to Carry Out a Duty Existing Apart from the Promise," lists three situations in which the
statute is not applicable because the promise "involves no more
than
a) the application of funds or property then or thereafter put
in the hands of the promisor for the purpose, or
b) performance of any other duty owing, irrespective of his
promise, by the promisor to the promisee, or
c) performance of a duty which is either owing, irrespective
of his promise, by the promisor to the third person, or which
the promisee is justified in believing to be so owing.""'
Part a) envisages the situations in which the promisor was constituted trustee for the benefit of the promisee and the promise
amounts to no more than an assurance that the terms of the trust
will be complied with. While the doctrine of consideration might
create some doubts as to the validity of such a promise, and while
it might be difficult to determine whether the transfer of the fund
amounted to the creation of a trust in a given case,1 0 the statute
of frauds does not come into operation.
Promises by a retiring partner to partnership creditors that
he will pay certain partnership debts and promises by persons who
are already liable on the third party beneficiary doctrine are of the
type contemplated by part b) In such cases, again, the legal effect
of the new promise might create certain doubts insofar as the
'ssMartin v. Fee, (1929) 177 Minn. 592, 226 N. W 203.
1SORestatement, Security, sec. 91. See also Restatement, Contracts, sec.
182.

'8 0 See 1 Scott, The Law of Trusts (1939) sec. 14, 2 Williston, A Treatise
on the Law of Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 348, particularly footnote 6.
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doctrine of consideration is concerned,919 but non-compliance with
the statute of frauds would not be a bar to its enforcement. That
the promise creating the liability to the beneficiary in the first instance is not within the statute has already been discussed.19 As a word of caution, it must be understood that the new
promise must not alter the nature or enlarge the scope of the
already existing liability to the promisee. If, for instance, the
existing "liability" were only such in the strict Hohfeldian sense' 9 '
as employed by the Restatement of Property,' and is transformed
by the promise into a "duty," the statute of frauds applies. Thus,
if A's property is encumbered by a mortgage as security for B's
debt, A's promise to guarantee personally the debt in consideration
that the creditor grant more time to the debtor will be within the
statute if A's leading purpose is to accommodate B and not to
forestall foreclosure on his land. 95
While apparently no Minnesota case has been decided on the
principles stated, there is language in several opinions which warrants the conclusion that our jurisdiction is in accord with parts
a) and b) of the Restatement rule. The first Minnesota decision
involving the statute of frauds stated that the promise to pay the
debt of another had to be-in writing "except wvhere
the amount
was placed in the hands of the promisor, by which it might be
discharged."'19 A case in which the court could have invoked the
doctrine is Walsh v. Kattenburgh.9" There defendant had bought
certain logs subject to plaintiff's loggers' lien, and as part of the
consideration for the sale had undertaken to pay the lienor. Subsequently the purchaser made a similar promise to the plaintiff.
While the court could have considered the first promise as creating a right in the plaintiff against the defendant and the second
promise as orally binding within the principles here discussed, the
decision was actually rested on the main purpose rule because the
first promise was held invalid. 9 8 Two subsequent cases referred
to the same principles but considered it unnecessary to base their
decision on them. 99 It might be added that where a surety merely
19'See
I Williston, op. cit. supra note 190, secs. 143, 190, 196.
92
' 93
See supra pp. 634-640 ff.
Hohfeld,
Fundamental Jural Relations Contrasted With One Another,
(1913)9 23 Yale L. J. 28.
'195 Restatement, Property, sec. 3.
' Cf: 2 Williston. op. cit. supra note 190, sec. 459.
'OrDufolt v. Gorman, (1857) 1 Minn. 301, 66 Am. Dec. 543.
397(1863) 8 Ifinn. 127.
19s See supra note 167 and text thereto.
199Grant v. Wolf, (1885) 34 Minn. 32, 24 N. W 289; Crane v. Wheeler,
(1892) 48 Minn. 207, 50 N. W 1033.
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waives certain incidents of his existing legal relationship, as where
he assents to an extension of tune, the statute is likewise not
applicable.20 °
The third category of promises listed by the Restatement contemplates mainly the "clearing house" type of transaction-A agreeing with his debtor B, that he should make payment to A's creditor,
C. That the statute of frauds in such cases is not applicable to B's
promise to either A or C seems to be settled and was recognized
by our court in Farmers State Bank v Anderson.20 The case involved a suit on an acceptance by a contractor of an order drawn
by a subcontractor in favor of plaintiff, the subcontractor's bank,
in order to take care of the payments due from the contractor to
the subcontractor and from the latter to plaintiff.
V
CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis of the Minnesota cases demonstrates
that the Supreme Court of our state has never strayed far from the
course adopted by the Restatement and has hewn its path in line
with that of the liberal trend in construction of section 4 of the
statute of frauds.
It is true that the origins of the statute place it in line with
a general European trend during the seventeenth century which
considered the requirement of a written memorandum as a cure-all
for a multitude of evils-particularly the danger of perjury, and
it is also true that its various drafts show that the framers of the
statute pursued no consistent theory of their own. 20 2 Nevertheless,
the section which we have discussed has become a corrective to
certain expansions of the doctrine of consideration. Apparently
the courts have felt that promises of guaranty, while binding (although the benefit might enure only to the principal), should not
be enforceable unless their formality demonstrates that they wire
made and not made rashly. The exclusion of situations which ,fall
under the scope of the entire credit test and the independent economic advantage rule in fact takes account of the well-acknowledged
informality of commercial contracts.
Underlying the whole problem of the abolition of the statute is
2OOBandler v. Bradley, (1910) 110 Minn. 66, 124 N. W 644, Amidon v.
Traverse Land Co., (1930) 181 Minn. 249, 232 N. W 33.
201(1935) 195 Minn. 475, 263 N. W 443.
202
Rabel, The Statute of Frauds And Comparative Legal History, (1947)
63 L. Q. Rev. 174.
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a question of fundamental policy If the section discussed performs
the function of correcting certain dangers flowing from the liberalization of the doctrine of consideration, it certainly will not be
kindly treated by anyone who believes that modern conditions
require that any oral promise which is not directed to au illegal
object should- be binding under all circumstances. If, on the other
hand, it is considered to be a principle of sound legal policy that
the promisee must have been justified in relying on the promise,
the requirement of certain formalities for promises made where the
promisee knowvs that only himself or a relative or friend of the
promisor received an advantage is not so shocking as some critics
-3
like to insist.2
20 3

For a liberal, lucid and careful analysis of the problem of consideration

and form, see Fuller, Consideration and Form, (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 799.

